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MARYLAND'S STATUTORY HEARSAY EXCEPTION 
FOR RELIABLE STATEMENTS BY ALLEGED 
CHILD ABUSE VICTIMS: A HESITANT 
STEP FORWARD 
Lynn McLaint 
The Maryland General Assembly recently passed legislation, 
effective July 1, 1988, which grants a trial court the opportunity 
to allow a physician, psychologist, social worker, or teacher to 
testify to an out-ol-court statement made by an alleged child 
abuse victim if the court finds that the circumstances in which 
the statement was made exhibit sufficient particularized guaran-
tees of reliability. This article discusses the need for such an ex-
ception to the rule precluding admission of hearsay for 
statements made by alleged victims of child abuse, exposes the 
inadequacies of pre-existing exceptions, addresses the constitu-
tional considerations raised by admission of such hearsay state-
ments, and studies the approaches taken by other jurisdictions. 
The author critiques the new Maryland statute and urges the 
adoption of liberalizing amendments. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a child abuse prosecution, the state must prove beyond a reason-
able doubt not only that the child victim was abused, but also that the 
defendant was the abuser. Thus, even overwhelming physical evidence of 
. abuse will be insufficient to support a conviction absent compelling proof 
of the identity of the abuser. Although the state may have other testi-
mony to the physical evidence of abuse and any resulting emotional 
problems manifested by the child, because child abuse - particularly 
sexual abuse - generally occurs in secret, with only the abuser and the 
victim present, the child almost always will be the only witness who can 
identify the assailant. If the child cannot testify at trial, and the child's 
prior statements identifying the defendant are inadmissible in evidence, 
the prosecution must be dropped. l 
t Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. B.A., 1971, University of 
Pennsylvania; J.D., 1974, Duke University Law School. The author wishes to ex-
press her appreciation to Elizabeth Conklyn for her research assistance. 
1. See Note, Videotaping the Testimony of an Abused Child: Necessary Protection for 
the Child or Unwarranted Compromise of the Defendant's Constitutional Rights?, 3 
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For example, a child sexual abuse prosecution against Jamal Craig, 
the teenaged son of the operator of the Craig Country Preschool in How-
ard County, Maryland, was dismissed in the summer of 1987 when the 
trial judge found the seven-year-old alleged victim incompetent to testify 
because she had no memory at the time of trial of the alleged abuse.2 
Under then applicable Maryland law, no hearsay exception existed under 
which the child's out-of-court statement, which identified the alleged 
abuser, might have been admissible in evidence. A considerable number 
of states, on the other hand, had recognized a hearsay exception for relia-
ble out-of-court statements by alleged child abuse victims.3 
In the 1988 legislative session, the Maryland General Assembly 
passed a bill that recognized, under certain circumstances, a hearsay ex-
ception for reliable out-of-court statements made by alleged child abuse 
victims when they were eleven years old or younger.4 Under the result-
ing enactment (the "1988 Act") the state may offer the testimony of a 
physician, psychologist, social worker, or teacher5 with respect to an out-
of-court statement of the alleged child abuse victim, provided that the 
state gives the defendant pretrial notice of its intention to offer such testi-
mony and notice of the content of the statement. 6 The defense may de-
pose the witness whom the state intends to call. 7 Then, in a hearing 
outside the presence of the jury, the trial judge will determine on the 
record whether the out-of-court statement has sufficient circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness to be admitted in evidence. 8 
Once the judge finds that the statement is reliable, it is admissible in 
evidence if one of two conditions exists: Either (1) the child victim is 
available to testify in person or by closed circuit television and can be 
UTAH L. REV. 461, 461 & nn. 1 & 4 (1956); Comment, The Young Victim as Witness 
for the Prosecution: Another Form of Abuse?, 89 DICK. L. REV. 721, 721-22 (1985) 
(cases reported dropped for this reason include one where three-year-old boy had 
gonorrhea of the mouth, penis, and rectum). 
The same reasoning that is applicable to criminal prosecutions applies to civil 
proceedings regarding allegations of child abuse, such as those concerning custody 
awards and visitation rights. This article should be read with this thought in mind. 
Although the confrontation clauses, infra at text accompanying notes 40-63, do not 
apply in civil cases, the applicability of the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment to the United States Constitution mandates much the same constitu-
tional analysis of the hearsay exception proposed here. Myers, Hearsay Statements 
by the Child Abuse Victim, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 775, 853-54 (1986). 
2. See Craig Witness Said to Identify Other Abusers, Baltimore Sun, Aug: 25, 1987, at 
2D, col. 6; Howard Prosecutors Drop One Abuse Case Against Craig Youth; Other 
Cases Remain, Baltimore Sun, July 29, 1987, at ID, col. 3. 
3. See infra note 64 and accompanying text. 
4. S. 66, 1988 Md. Laws 548 (adding new section 9-103.1 to the Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings article of the Maryland Annotated Code, enacted concurrently with 
identical H.D. 1018, 1988 Md. Laws 549) [hereinafter "S. 66"]. 
5. S. 66 § 9-103.1 (b)(2). 
6. Id. § 9-103.1(c)(3). 
7. Id. § 9-103. 1 (c)(4). 
8. Id. § 9-103. 1 (e). 
1987] Hearsay Exception for Child Abuse Victims 3 
cross-examined about the statement;9 or (2) the child victim is unavaila-
ble to testify due to the child's "death; absence from the jurisdiction, for 
good cause shown, and the state has been unable to procure the child's 
presence by subpoena or other reasonable means; serious physical disabil-
ity; or inability to communicate about the alleged offense due to serious 
emotional distress;"10 the statement is not covered by any other hearsay 
exception; and there is corroborative evidence. I I The child's statement 
would not be admissible, however, if the child's inability to communicate 
about the alleged offense is caused by any reason other than serious emo-
tional distress. 12 
This article will discuss the need for and the constitutionality of a 
hearsay exception for reliable out-of-court statements by alleged child 
abuse victims under Maryland law. It will then give examples of the 
approaches which have been adopted by other states and endorsed by 
various commentators and groups and will discuss in detail Maryland's 
approach, the 1988 Act. Finally, the author proposes adoption of 
amendments that will broaden the 1988 Act in certain respects. 
II. THE NEED FOR A CHILD ABUSE VICTIM 
HEARSAY EXCEPTION 
The purpose of the hearsay rule is to exclude unreliable evidence, 
the credibility of which the trier of fact will not be in a position to evalu-
ate effectively. 13 The rule excludes from evidence an out-of-courtI4 state-
mentiS offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted by the out-of-
court declarant at the time he or she made the statement. 16 Because the 
exclusion of all such out-of-court statements would be to exclude a great 
deal of reliable evidence, many "hearsay exceptions" have evolved. 
Each exception makes admissible a particular class of out-of-court 
statements which is believed to have circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness. The Federal Rules of Evidence recognize twenty-nine hear-
say exceptions,17 including two "catch-all" exceptions for necessary and 
reliable hearsay not falling within more specific exceptions. IS Twenty-
9. Id. § 9-103. 1 (c)(l). 
10. Id. § 9-103. 1 (c)(2)(i). 
11. Id. § 9-103. 1 (c)(2)(ii)-(iii). 
12. This reading of the statute results from application of the canon, "expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius" ("the expression of the one is the exclusion of the other"). See 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 521 (5th ed. 1979). 
13. L. McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL § 801.1 (1987). 
14. Id. § 801.2. 
15. Id. §§ 801.3-.4. 
16. Id. § 801.5. See, e.g., In re Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 1127, 1131-32, 200 
Cal. Rptr. 789, 807-08, 810-11 (1984) (victim'S play with dolls was nonassertive 
conduct and nonhearsay; evidence of her belief that her father had sexually as-
saulted her was also non hearsay in dependency hearing and supported denial of 
father's visitation rights). See generally Myers, supra note 1, at 779-814. 
17. FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(24), 804(b)(I)-(5). 
18. See generally McLAIN, supra note 13, §§ 803(24).2, 804(5).2. 
4 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 17 
four of these exceptions are applicable regardless of whether the out-of-
court declarant is available to testify at trial,19 and five may be used only 
if the declarant is unavailable to testify due to death, illness, absence 
from the jurisdiction (not procured by the proponent of the statement), 
privilege, lack of memory, or refusal to testify despite an order of the 
court to do SO.20 
Maryland statutory and common law also recognizes dozens of 
hearsay exceptions, similarly divided.21 Two general hearsay exceptions 
recognized under Maryland law have been used on occasion to admit 
out-of-court statements by alleged child libuse victims: (1) statements 
made to a physician for purposes of obtaining medical treatment, and (2) 
startled or excited utterances. Two other recognized exceptions would 
be available in appropriate cases:22 (1) prompt complaints of rape, and 
(2) dying declarations. Each of these four exceptions, however, has its 
limitations. 
19. See id. §§ 803.2-803(24).2. The propollent of the statement need not ordinarily 
prove the competency of the declarant. Id. § 803.2 & n.4. See infra note 72. 
20. McLAIN, supra note 13, §§ 804.2-804(5).2. 
21. See generally id., §§ 803-804(5). 
22. Maryland, unlike many other jurisdictions including the federal courts, has not 
codified a residual hearsay exception for hearsay not falling within specific excep-
tions but having comparable circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. Cases 
affirming the admission of out-of-court statements of child abuse victims under such 
catch-all exceptions include the following: United States v. De Noyer, 811 F.2d 436 
(8th Cir. 1987) (statements that five-year-old boy, who testified at trial, had made 
to social workers were properly admitted under FED. R. EVID. 803(4) and 803(24»; 
United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1443 (8th Cir. 1986) (when five-year-old 
girl testified at trial, but "because of her age and obvious fright," she did not testify 
meaningfully, her reliable out-of-court statement to her emergency foster mother, 
made during third interview on the subject, was properly admitted under FED. R. 
EVID. 803(24»; Bertrang v. State, 50 Wis.2d 702, 708, 184 N.W.2d 867, 870 (1971) 
(out-of-court statements by nine-year-old sexually abused girl to her mother; court 
considered "the age of the child, the nature of the assault, physical evidence of such 
assault, relationship of the child to the defendant, contemporaneity and spontaneity 
of the assertions in relation to the alleged assault, the reliability of the assertions 
themselves, and the reliability of the testifying witness") noted in Anderson, Chil-
dren's Out-ol-Court Statements Under Rule 908.3 of the Wisconsin Rules of Evi-
dence, 47 WIS. B. BULL. 47 (Oct., 1974). See also Oldsen v. People, 732 P.2d 1132 
(Colo. 1986) (trial court erred in admitting five-year-old's out-of-court statements to 
school psychologist, physician, and social worker under Rule 803(4), but majority of 
appellate court affirmed on ground that statements were admissible under Rule 
803(24» (Erickson, J., dissenting, found inadequate record to support admissibility 
under Rule 803(24»; State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159, 161-65 (S.D. 1984) (re-
manded for determination whether statement which did not qualify as excited utter-
ance or present sense impression fell within Rule 804(b)(5) when child took stand 
but could not testify meaningfully) noted in Note, State v. McCafferty: The Conflict 
Between a Defendant's Right to Confrontation and the Need for Children's Hearsay 
Statements in Sexual Abuse Cases, 30 S. OAK. L. REV. 663 (1985). But see State v. 
Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 90-99, 337 S.E.2d 833, 843-48 (1985) (error to admit child 
victims' statements to two Rape Task Force volunteers under Rule 803(24); record 
did not reflect support for finding of necessity required under rule). See generally 
Myers, supra note 1, at 893-906. 
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A. Statements Made In Order to Obtain Medical Treatment 
A patient's out-of-court statement to a treating physician is admissi-
ble in evidence to the extent that it relates facts relevant to treatment, 
regardless of whether the patient is available to testify.23 The circum-
stantial guarantee of reliability is found in the patient's self-interest in 
obtaining proper treatment, which is thought likely to override any mo-
tive for insincerity. Therefore, if a child complains to a doctor that he 
has been injured in a particular way by a particular person, the doctor 
may testify at trial to the physical acts described by the child. The doc-
tor ordinarily may not testify to the child's identification of the assailant, 
however, because that fact usually is not relevant to medical treatment.24 
B. Excited Utterances 
A child's out-of-court statement will be admissible as an excited ut-
terance if it was made spontaneously while the child remained under con-
tinuing stress from a startling event, regardless of whether the child is 
available to testify.25 The theory of reliability of excited utterances is 
23. E.g., Shirks Motor Express v. Oxenham, 204 Md. 626, 635-36, 106 A.2d 46, 49-50 
(1954). See generally McLAIN, supra note 13, § 803(4).1. This exception would be 
unavailable if the declarant was not seeking medical treatment. W.c.L., Jr. v. Peo-
ple, 685 P.2d 176, 181 (Colo. 1984) (en banc). 
24. See Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 25-30, 39-50, 536 A.2d 666, 678-80, 684-90 
(1988) (child's statements identifying alleged abuser held inadmissible even though 
made to treating physician, because child did not understand that purpose of physi-
cian's questions was to enable physician to make diagnosis); cf Moore v. State, 26 
Md. App. 556, 559-67, 338 A.2d 344, 345-50 (out-of-court statement by three-and-
one-half-year-old child to physician, within hours after alleged beating, that "Daddy 
was mad, Daddy did it," was admissible, but under hearsay exception for excited 
utterances), cert. denied, 276 Md. 747 (1975). 
Some courts outside Maryland have stretched this exception to admit the 
child's identification of the abuser as relevant to the physician's proposed course of 
treatment, particularly when the alleged abuser lives with the child. See United 
States v. De Noyer, 811 F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1987) (statements that five-year-old boy, 
who testified at trial, had made to social workers were properly admitted under 
FED. R. EVID. 803(4), 803(24»; State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 337 S.E.2d 833, (1985) 
(four and five-year-old girls' statements to grandmother properly admitted under 
medical treatment exception) noted in Note, Evidence - North Carolina Allows Ad-
mission of the Unthinkable Hearsay Exceptions and Statements Made By Sexually 
Abused Children - State v. Smith, 9 CAMPBELL L. REV. 437 (1987) [hereinafter 
Note, Unthinkable Hearsay Exceptions]; Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo. 
1983) (over dissent), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253 (1984) noted in Note, Evidence-
Hearsay - Child Abuse and Neglect - A Child's Statements Naming an Abuser Are 
Admissible Under the Medical Diagnosis of Treatment Exception to the Hearsay Rule 
- Goldade v. State, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 1155 (1984); Ringland, Child Sex Abuse 
Evidence Problems, 12 U. DAYTON L. REV. 27, 35-38 (1986). These cases also illus-
trate that the courts extend the exception to non-physicians from whom the child 
would seek help. See also Myers, supra note 1, at 889-93. 
25. E.g., Moore v. State, 26 Md. App. 556, 562, 566, 338 A.2d 344, 347, 349 (1975), 
cert. denied, 276 Md. 747 (1975); State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 86-90, 337 S.E.2d 
833,841-43 (1985). See generally McLAIN, supra note 13, § 803(2).1; Myers, supra 
note 1, at 859-75; Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in 
Sex Abuse Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1745, 1753-59 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Com-
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that the continuing stress stills the declarant's ability to fabricate. 26 If, 
for example, a child escaped from his attacker and ran to a police officer 
and blurted out what had happened, the police officer could testify to the 
child's statement,27 
Often, however, a child's reports of abuse are neither spontaneous 
(but instead are in response to questioning)28 nor made while the child 
has remained under such continuing stress as to preclude his conscious 
thinking and functioning. The child may have been intimidated by his 
abuser not to tell anyone, may feel guilty, or may repress the experi-
ence.29 For these reasons, he may not tell anyone until a parent, a 
teacher, or a doctor notices some change in his physical condition or his 
behavior and questions him about it - or until the threat of repeated 
abuse is imminent. In those situations, the child's statement regarding 
the earlier abuse will not qualify as an excited utterance. 30 
For example, in one Maryland case, the mother of the alleged child 
abuse victim testified that when the defendant, a neighbor, came over to 
the child's house and asked the mother to allow the child, a five-year-old, 
to visit him, the child told her about sexual abuse by that neighbor which 
had occurred eleven days earlier.31 The defendant's conviction was re-
prehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements]; Note, Unthinkable Hearsay Ex-
ceptions, supra note 24, at 450-52. 
Other possibly available hearsay exceptions inclUde those for present sense im-
pressions and the state of mind exception. See Myers, supra note I, at 855-58, 887-
89. 
26. E.g., Mouzone v. State, 294 Md. 692, 697, 452 A.2d 661, 664 (1982). 
27. See Sears v. State, 9 Md. App. 375, 383-84, 264 A.2d 485, 488-89 (police officer's 
testimony to statements within one-half hour of assault, made by eleven-year-old 
victim after she had fled to the police station, was properly admitted), cert. denied, 
258 Md. 730 (1970); Smith v. State, 6 Md. App. 581, 252 A.2d 277 (four-year-old's 
out-of-court statement to her mother, four to five hours after rape but first words 
spoken by her during that time, was properly admitted), cert. denied, 256 Md. 748 
(1969). 
28. See Cassidy, 74 Md. App. at 16-23, 536 A.2d at 673-77 (child's statements made 
three days after alleged abuse and in response to physician's question, "Who did 
this?" held inadmissible under excitable utterance exception). Some simple ques-
tioning, such as asking the declarant "What happened?", may not preclude the ad-
mission of the responsive statement. Johnson v. State, 63 Md. App. 485, 494-95, 
492 A.2d 1343, 1347-48, cert. denied, 304 Md. 298, 498 A.2d 1185 (1985); Long v. 
State, 3 Md. App. 638, 240 A.2d 620 (1968) (per curiam). 
29. Note, Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements, supra note 25, at 1756; 
Note, Evidence - Sexual Abuse of Children: The Justification for a New Hearsay 
Exception,S MISS. C.L. REV. 177, 180 (1985) [hereinafter Justification for a New 
Hearsay Exception]. The child also may not understand that the abuse is wrongful. 
Note, Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements, supra note 25, at 1756; 
Note, Justification for a New Hearsay Exception, supra note 29, at 180. 
30. E.g., In re Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, lBO, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789, 809-10 
(1984); W.c.L., Jr. v. People, 685 P.2d 176, 178-81 (Colo. 1984) (en bane) (state-
ment was neither spontaneous nor prompt); Deloso v. State, 37 Md. App. WI, 102-
07, 376 A.2d 873, 875-77 (1977) (reversible error to admit proof of five-year-old's 
apparently "quite casual" complaints of beatings by her father); State v. Slider, 38 
Wash. App. 689, 690-94, 688 P.2d 538, 540-41 (1984). 
31. Harnish v. State, 9 Md. App. 546, 548,266 A.2d 364, 365 (1970). 
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versed by the court of special appeals on the ground that the child's state-
ment to his mother was made too long after the event to be admissible as 
an excited utterance. 32 
C Prompt Reports of Rape 
Maryland recognizes a hearsay exception for a victim's prompt re-
port of rape. The report is admissible to corroborate the victim's testi-
mony as long as the victim is present at trial and available for cross-
examination.33 If the child was raped, his or her prompt out-of-court 
statement to a third person might be admissible under this exception.34 
Again, however, children often may not make prompt reports. More-
over, the child victim frequently is not available for cross-examination at 
trial because the judge has found him or her incompetent to testify. In 
either event, the hearsay exception for complaints of rape would be 
inapplicable. 
D. Dying Declarations 
A final hearsay exception which could be available under Maryland 
law in child abuse cases is the dying declaration exception. Under this 
32. Id. at 551, 266 A.2d at 366. 
33. E.g., State v. Werner, 302 Md. 550, 563,489 A.2d 1119, 1125-26 (1985). See Mc-
LAIN, supra note 13, § 801(2).1 & n.2. 
34. See In re Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 1130,200 Cal. Rptr. 789, 808-09 (1984) 
(statement did not qualify); State v. Segerberg, 131 Conn. 546, 549, 41 A.2d 101, 
102-03 (1945) (complaint exception available only if victim testifies); State v. Camp-
bell, 299 Or. 633, 705 P.2d 694 (1985) (applying OR. EVID. CODE 803 (18)(a» noted 
in Note, Can You Hear What I Hear? Direction and Limitation on Allowable Hear-
say Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: State v. Campbell, 22 WILLIAMETTE 
L.J. 421 (1986). See generally Myers, supra note 1, at 875-77; Note, The Effects of 
the Abolition of the Corroboration Requirement in Child Sexual Assault Cases, 36 
CATH. U.L. REV. 793, 804-05 (1987). 
Some states have recognized a similar hearsay exception for statements by a 
child of "tender years" reporting sexual abuse. See People v. Mikula, 84 Mich. 
App. 108, 116-17,269 N.W.2d 195, 199 (1978) (per curiam) ("Hearsay testimony 
concerning the details of a complaint of sexual assault is admissible where the com-
plainant is of 'tender years' if her statement is shown to have been spontaneous and 
without indication of manufacture, and if any delay in making the complaint is 
excusable insofar as it is caused by fear or other equally effective circumstances .... 
Only the original account of the assault, however, may be related by a witness. It 
was improper for the trial court to permit subsequent accounts into evidence."); 
Williams v. State, 427 So.2d 100 (Miss. 1983) (eleven-year-old girl's statements to 
her mother and sister found admissible; court followed Mikula). See also Bridges v. 
State, 247 Wis. 350, 362-63, 19 N.W.2d 529, 534, reh'g denied, 247 Wis. 374, 19 
N.W.2d 862 (1945) ("where the person ravished is very young, testimony as to the 
particulars of such statements by her is admissible") (now legislatively overruled); 
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-10 (1987); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07 
(Vernon 1987). The common law Michigan "tender years" exception was elimi-
nated when that state adopted the Michigan Rules of Evidence. Note, Comprehen-
sive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements, supra note 25, at 1759-61. See also 
Note, A Tender Years Doctrine for the Juvenile Courts: An Effective Way to Protect 
the Sexually Abused Child, 61 U. DETROIT J. URB. LAW 249 (1984). 
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exception, the child victim's statement describing the attack and identify-
ing the attacker would be admissible if the child made the statement 
under the belief that death was imminent and did in fact die. 35 This 
exception, however, is available only in homicide cases.36 
E. Insufficiency of Other Exceptions 
The hearsay exceptions currently recognized in Maryland and used 
prior to the 1988 Act provide avenues for the admissibility of only a 
small percentage of a child abuse victim's reliable out-of-court state-
ments. Such statements frequently are essential to the state's case, how-
ever, because a young child often will be found incompetent and thus 
unable to testify at trial due to a lack of present memory of the event. 
This inability to recollect may be the negative result of a prolonged 
pretrial process. In fact, a common defense tactic is to seek to prolong 
the pretrial process as long as possible with the hope that the child will 
forget about the attack. On the other hand, the child's forgetting of sex-
ual abuse may sometimes be the therapeutically positive result sought by 
psychotherapists working with young children. 37 Regardless of how this 
result is reached, the consequence is the same: if the child is unable to 
testify at trial and if the child's out-of-court statement identifying the 
defendant is found inadmissible, the prosecution will most likely have to 
be dropped. 
Even if the child testifies at trial, it seems likely that, as in rape 
cases, the question that will be in the jurors' minds - even absent im-
peachment - is when did the child come up with this story? As in rape 
cases, the prosecution should be entitled to answer that question, which 
if left unanswered, might lead a jury to find that the state had not met its 
burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Reliability of the 
child's testimony may be bolstered by a prior consistent out-of-court 
statement made by the child, but under Maryland law prior to the 1988 
Act, such a statement was inadmissible unless the child had been im-
peached in a particular way, such as by proof of the child's bias or prior 
inconsistent statement.38 
35. See generally McLAIN, supra note 13, § 804(2).1. The shouted statement of a four-
teen-year-old girl, as she threw herself in front of a train, that "she was taking her 
life because of anguish over early morning sexual assaults by her father," was admit-
ted as evidence in the father's Virginia trial for aggravated sexual battery. Father 
Guilty of Molesting Virginia Teen-ager, The Washington Post, Oct. 17, 1986, at Cl, 
col. 6. The dying declaration exception apparently was the avenue by which the 
trial court admitted that statement. 
36. McLAIN, supra note 13, § 804(2).1 at 462. E.g., Connor v. State, 225 Md. 543, 550-
54, 171 A.2d 699, 703-05, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 906 (1961). 
37. Telephone conversation with Gayle O'Callaghan, Psy. D., Director of Sexual Abuse 
Unit at Sinai Hospital, Baltimore, Md., Sept. 16, 1987 (such a result is sometimes 
desirable for children under eight years old, because they may not yet have the 
cognitive skills to understand the abuse; it may also be sought for particular chil-
dren between the ages of eight and twelve). 
38. See generally McLAIN, supra note 13, § 613.2; Myers, supra note 1, at 801-09. 
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For these reasons, a new hearsay exception for reliable out-of-court 
statements by alleged child abuse victims merited legislative adoption in 
Maryland.39 
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE EXCEPTION 
A hearsay exception for reliable out-of-court statements by alleged 
child abuse victims is constitutional,40 despite arguments by opponents 
that it violates the accused's confrontation right. The sixth amendment 
to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states through 
the fourteenth amendment due process clause,41 provides: "In all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him .... "42 Article 21 of the Maryland Decla-
ration of Rights similarly provides: "[I]n all criminal prosecutions every 
man hath a right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him, ... 
39. Accord Dorf, Child Abuse: The Second Victimization, 17:1 U. BALT. L. FORUM 24 
(1986); McGrath & Clemens, The Child Victim as a Witness in Sexual Abuse Cases, 
46 MONT. L. REV. 229 (1985). See also Skoler, New Hearsay Exceptions for a 
Child's Statement of Sexual Abuse, 18 J. MAR. L. REv. 1, 5-9, 40-42 (1984) (need 
for exception); Note, Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements, supra 
note 25, at 1749-51. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland arguably was free to create such an excep-
tion judicially. See McLAIN, supra note 13, §§ 803(24).1 and 804(5).1. See also 
State v. Campbell, 705 P.2d 694 (Or. 1985) (recognizing judicially created exception 
for statement of child abuse victim). This was unlikely to occur, however. The 
probability was very small that an appellate court would have the opportunity to 
decide whether to adopt an exception, because the prosecution's ability to appeal 
from an acquittal is constitutionally circumscribed. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 
U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy prohibition of fifth amendment to United States 
Constitution is enforceable against states through fourteenth amendment); MD. 
Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-401(a) (1984) (state may appeal from final 
judgment of a criminal case if state alleges that trial judge failed to impose sentence 
specifically mandated by Code - implicitly may not appeal on other grounds). 
Also, in order for an appellate court to have this evidentiary issue before it on ap-
peal by the defendant, the trial judge must have admitted evidence that is clearly 
inadmissible as hearsay. Therefore, the Maryland General Assembly was in a better 
position to act. 
40. See People v. Orduno, 80 Cal. App. 3d 738, 145 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1978) (admission of 
excited utterance or prompt complaint by victim who is unavailable to testify, be-
cause too young, does not infringe defendant's confrontation right); Note, Justifica-
tionfor a New Hearsay Exception, supra note 29, at 178-79, 185; Note, Minnesota's 
Hearsay Exception lor Child Victims of Sexual Abuse, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
799 (1985); Note, The Sexually Abused Infant Hearsay Exception: A Constitutional 
Analysis, 8 J. Juv. L. 59 (1984); Comment, Legislative Responses to Child Sexual 
Abuse Cases: The Hearsay Exception and the Videotape Deposition, 34 CATH. U.L. 
REV. 1021 (1985); Comment, The Young Victim as Witnessfor the Prosecution: An-
other Form of Abuse?, 89 DICK. L. REV. 721, 745-46 (1985). But see Comment, 
Confronting Child Victims of Sex Abuse: The Unconstitutionality of the Sexual 
Abuse Hearsay Exception, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 387 (1984) (arguing that the 
Washington statute's allowance of admission of out-of-court statements of children 
incompetent to testify is unconstitutional) [hereinafter Comment, Unconstitutional-
ity of the Sexual Abuse Hearsay Exception]. 
41. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
42. U.S. CaNST., amend. VI. 
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[and] to examine the witnesses for and against him on oath .... "43 
These confrontation clauses, on their face, seem to contemplate the 
witness's appearance at trial and availability for cross-examination by the 
accused. Thus, if the declarant whose out-of-court statement is admitted 
at trial also testifies at trial or is available to be cross-examined by the 
accused, no conflict with the confrontation right exists.44 
The United States Supreme Court, in its 1980 decision in Ohio v. 
Roberts,45 has also made clear that even if the declarant is unavailable to 
testify at trial, the admission of his out-of-court statement will not violate 
the defendant's confrontation right if the hearsay either (1) falls within 
well-established, historical hearsay exceptions or (2) is otherwise neces-
sary and reliable, that is, it bears "particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness. "46 
43. MD. DECL. OF RTS., art. 21. See, e.g., Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 530 A.2d 
275 (1987) (discussing history of art. 21). See generally McLAIN, supra note 13, 
§ 801.1 at 270 n.4. 
44. See State v. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d 308,313 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (victim testified at 
trial); McNeil, The Admissibility of Child Victim Hearsay in Kansas: A Defense 
Perspective, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 265, 276 (1984) (cross-examination of declarant at 
trial sufficient); Myers, supra note 1, at 828 (no confrontation right problem if vic-
tim testifies); Comment, Unconstitutionality of the Sexual Abuse Hearsay Exception, 
supra note 40, at 399 (semble); Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse 
Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806, 810, 817, 822, 
826 (1985) (semble). See also Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face-to-Face Con-
frontation: Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 19, 34-37, 45-47, 63-67 (1985) (arguing that a statute which does not require 
prosecution to call available victim to testify is unconstitutional). But see State v. 
Thompson, 379 N.W.2d 295, 297 (S.D. 1985) (if declarant is available, out-of-court 
statement must be even more reliable, in order to be admissible, than if declarant is 
unavailable). 
45. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
46. Id. at 65-66. See, e.g., United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1446-47 (8th Cir. 
1986) (no violation of accused's confrontation right to admit five-year-old victim's 
statement to her emergency foster mother, when child could not testify meaning-
fully at trial, so that she "was, for all practical purposes, 'unavailable'," and other 
Roberts requirements were met) (over dissent of Bright, J.); Ellison v. Sachs, 583 F. 
Supp. 1241, 1245-46 (D. Md. 1984) (summarizing applicable case law), aff'd, 769 
F.2d 955 (4th Cir. 1985); State v. Burns, 112 Wis. 2d 131,332 N.W.2d 757 (1983) 
(admission of sexual assault victim's preliminary hearing testimony did not violate 
confrontation right when physician testified that victim was severely mentally ill 
and that, if victim were required to testify, a moderate to severe relapse would be 
highly probable). But see People v. Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d 505, 514-20, 194 Cal. 
Rptr. 431, 438-41, 668 P.2d 738 (1983) (en bane) (insufficient evidence of victim's 
mental illness to show unavailability; admission of out-of-court statement violated 
defendant's confrontation right). See generally Myers, supra note 1, at 820-54; Sko-
ler, supra note 39, at 14-18. 
As to what constitutes the requisite unavailability, and whether, for example, a 
child's psychological unavailability due to fear would suffice, see Warren v. United 
States, 436 A.2d 821 (D.C. App. 1981); Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 530 
A.2d 275 (1987) (unavailability is sufficiently established if testimony in open court 
will .. 'result in the child [witness] suffering serious emotional distress' ") (quoting 
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102(a)(I)(ii) (1984»; Bulkley, Evidentiary 
and Procedural Trends in State Legislation and Other Emerging Legal Issues in 
Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 89 DICK. L. REV. 645, 652-54 (1985); Graham, supra 
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Hearsay exceptions for statements by child abuse victims that have 
been recognized in other states parallel the trustworthiness requirement 
established in Roberts and thus have been upheld as constitutional. The 
highest court of Kansas has upheld the Kansas statute;47 the highest 
court of Oregon has upheld a similar judicially created exception;48 the 
highest court of Washington has upheld its statute as facially constitu-
tional;49 and the Indiana Court of Appeals50 and the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals have upheld their respective statutes.51 
note 44, at 76-94; Myers, supra note 1, at 831-40; Skoler, supra note 39, at 16-17; 
Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative 
Innovations, 98 HARv. L. REv. 806, 818-19 (1985). See also infra note 65. 
47. State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17,697 P.2d 836 (1985). Accord State v. Pendelton, 10 
Kan. App. 2d 26, 690 P.2d 959 (1984) (statement admitted under Kansas child 
victim statute probably also could have been admitted as excited utterance). But see 
McNeil, supra note 44, at 278, 282 (criticizing defense counsel's inability to have 
admitted exculpatory statements by non-victim children, and arguing that each 
party should have equal opportunity to examine the child victim, "preferably 
through independent testifying"). 
48. State v. Campbell, 299 Or. 633, 705 P.2d 694 (1985) (if trial court holds competency 
hearing and finds alleged victim of child abuse incompetent to testify, child's out-of-
court statements may be admitted under hearsay exception for complaints of sexual 
misconduct). 
49. State v. Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d 165,691 P.2d 197 (1984) (but conviction was reversed 
because statute had not been complied with). Accord State v. Fisher, 43 Wash. App. 
75,715 P.2d 530, 533 (1986); State v. Slider, 38 Wash. App. 689, 688 P.2d 538, 541 
(1984) (trial court erroneously admitted statement as excited utterance, but judg-
ment affirmed because statement fell within child victim statute, which is 
constitutional). 
50. Hopper v. State, 489 N.E.2d 1209 (Ind. App.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 592 (1986) 
(no violation of confrontation right; statement also qualified as excited utterance; 
child was unavailable to testify; state presented corroborating evidence of two 
eyewitnesses). 
51. State v. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (statute was both facially 
constitutional and constitutional as applied). 
Judge Moylan, in his opinion for the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in 
Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1,536 A.2d 666 (1988), stated that whether to create 
such a .. 'Tender Years' exception ... would be quintessentially a legislative deter-
mination." 74 Md. App. at 31,536 A.2d at 680. He proceeded to criticize such an 
exception, even if legislatively created, on three bases: (1) he questioned whether 
children were more likely to be truthful than adults; (2) if they were, he saw no 
reason to restrict the hearsay exception to child abuse cases; and (3) he noted: 
If the theory is that we should tolerate lesser reliability in cases of 
greater necessity, that might explain the application of the exception to 
child abuse cases as a class. It would not explain, however, the automatic 
application of the exception to a particular child abuse case where there is 
an ad hoc determination that the hearsay is not indispensable; nor would it 
explain the refusal to apply the exception to a particular burglary case 
where there is an ad hoc determination that the hearsay is indispensable. 
Id. at 32-33, 536 A.2d at 681-82. 
Child abuse hearsay exception statutes like the 1988 Act, however, do require a 
searching ad hoc inquiry by the trial judge into the reliability of each statement by 
each child. See S. 66, § 9-103. 1 (d). Under the 1988 Act, the court is even asked to 
consider the credibility of the witness. Id. § 9-103.1(d)(12). 
Also, the question of necessity historically has been decided with regard to a 
class of statements (that is, whether to recognize a 'hearsay exception for such a 
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Of course, the defendant would have a right to appeal the admission 
of hearsay on the basis of its trustworthiness. If the appellate court 
should find that the record did not support the trial court's finding that 
the particular hearsay admitted was reliable, its admission would be 
deemed u,nconstitutional. 52 
For example, in Ellison v. Sachs,53 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the holding of the United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland that the defendant's confron-
tation right was violated by the admission in state court of evidence of 
unreliable prior identifications of the defendant by the five-year-old al-
leged child abuse victim. The victim was found to be incompetent to 
testify at trial because she could not recall any events which occurred 
during the month of the alleged assault. 54 The federal courts' analyses in 
Ellison are instructive. 
Judge Miller of the district court expressed general wariness con-
cerning the admission of another's testimony to a young child's out-of-
court statements. 55 He stressed, however, that "most importantly, nu-
merous critical statements of identification made by the declarant [in El-
lison, at a date later than the date of statements testified to] were in direct 
contradiction to earlier statements·made by her."56 Judge Miller con-
cluded, "Without indicia of a high degree of trustworthiness under all the 
circumstances, the reception of the hearsay evidence was error of a con-
stitutional dimension."57 
A Fourth Circuit panel, 58 affirming in an opinion by Judge 
Murnaghan, held that although the child victim had been "subject to 
limited cross-examination" at a preliminary suppression hearing, the 
hearing transcript was inadmissible. 59 Judge Murnaghan stated: 
[W]here the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial, her state-
class) rather than on a case-by-case basis. For example, hearsay exceptions applica-
ble only when the declarant is unavailable to testify were created because of the 
greater need in general for the evidence. See McLAIN, supra note 13, § 804.1. The 
courts do not look at the need for the evidence in a particular case. 
Finally, although most hearsay exceptions are not restricted to certain types of 
cases, there is one exception. Dying declarations are admissible only in prosecutions 
for the homicide of the declarant. See id. § 804(2).1. 
52. E.g., Fuller v. State, 64 Md. App. 339, 351-53 & n.13, 495 A.2d 366, 372-73 & n.13 
(1981). For a similar conclusion as to the Washington statute, see Comment, Sex-
ual Abuse 0/ Children - Washington's New Hearsay Exception, 58 WASH. L. REV. 
813, 828-29 (1983). 
53. 769 F.2d 955 (4th Cir. 1985), aff'g 583 F.Supp. 1241 (D. Md. 1984). 
54. Id. at 957. 
55. Ellison v. Sachs, 583 F. Supp. 1241, 1249 (D. Md. 1984) ("The circumstance of the 
very tender age of the victim declarant ... rather than excusing the inconsistencies 
[in her out-of-court statements], strongly decreases the degree to which one can 
reasonably rely on such extrajudicial statements."). 
56.Id. 
57. Id. (emphasis supplied). 
58. Judge Sneeden concurred specially. Ellison, 769 F.2d at 957. 
59. Id. at 956. 
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ment is admissible only if there are adequate 'indicia of reliabil-
ity' to justify submitting the hearsay to the jury . . . . Thus, 
although the Sixth Amendment preserves the right of face to 
face confrontation, Ohio v. Roberts teaches that, where there 
are circumstances assuring the accuracy of hearsay, cross-ex-
amination is not talismanic of constitutional guarantees. 
Here, however, ... there are serious discrepancies which 
indicate that the victim's out-of-court statements and identifica-
tion of Ellison were not at all reliable. The obvious limitations 
in observation, expression and understanding of a five year old 
help explain the various discrepancies in her descriptions. But 
they also underscore the care with which courts must approach 
the question of introducing such hearsay, particularly when 
largely untested by cross-examination.60 
13 
Judge Murnaghan carefully differentiated between the victim's uncorrob-
orated out-of-court statements of identification, which "contained no suf-
ficient assurance of accuracy," and her out-of-court statement, 
corroborated by physical evidence, that she was sexually assaulted.61 
Perhaps one of the most important aspects of the Ellison decision is 
that it does not indicate that the Fourth Circuit would find unconstitu-
tional a statute making reliable out-of-court statements admissible. On 
the contrary, Judge Murnaghan cited statutes of six states as "legislative 
solutions" to the "reliability problem inherent in child-victim testimony 
in sexual abuse cases."62 He also underscored the point that "[a] deter-
mination of the reliability and trustworthiness of hearsay statements for 
constitutional purposes must, of course, proceed on a case by case 
basis."63 
60. Id. at 956-57 (emphasis supplied). 
61. Id. at 957. 
Id. 
In contrast to the identification itself we find no 'inherent unreliabil-
ity' in the victim's out-of-court statement, corroborated by physical evi-
dence, that a sexual assault occurred. Indeed, several courts and 
commentators have observed that a young child's description of a sexual 
assault may, in particular circumstances, contain its own inherent ver-
ity .... Here, we have no occasion to chart the instances where such 
hearsay might contain its own particular guarantee of trustworthiness. It 
is controlling, however, to note in the present case that, where her identifi-
cation was the sole evidence of the perpetrator's identity, the victim's testi-
mony contained no sufficient assurance of accuracy. 
Judge Sneeden, concurring specially, was concerned by the majority's refer-
ences to corroboration and lack of corroboration. He wrote: "We do not need to 
reach the issue of whether there must be corroborating evidence of a hearsay identi-
fication of the perpetrator by a child witness. It is not my wish to join in language 
which could be interpreted to require such corroboration in future cases not before 
me." Id. at 957-58. 
62. Id. at 957 (citing Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, Minnesota, Utah, and Washington 
statutes). 
63. Id. Accord State v. Superior Court, 149 Ariz. 397,405,719 P.2d 283, 291 (1986). 
See, e.g., State v. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (reliability of 
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Thus, a state statute which incorporates the requirements of Ohio v. 
Roberts is constitutional on its face. Its application in any particular case 
will be subject to appellate review to ensure that the admission of out-of-
court statements passed constitutional muster. 
IV. FORMS OF THE HEARSAY EXCEPTION RECOGNIZED 
OR PROPOSED BY OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
Prior to the passage of Maryland's 1988 Act, many states had 
passed statutes adopting a hearsay exception for reliable statements by 
child abuse victims.64 These statutes constitute several models for the 
Maryland General Assembly to consider in amending the 1988 Act. One 
type, of which the Kansas statute is an example, requires that the child 
victim's statements was amply demonstrated); State v. Frey, 43 Wash. App. 605, 
718 P.2d 846, 849-50 (1986) (statement was reliable); State v. Jackson, 42 Wash. 
App. 393, 711 P.2d 1086, 1089 (1985) (semble); State v. Gitchel, 41 Wash. App. 
820, 706 P.2d 1091, 1095-96 (1985) (semble). 
64. ALASKA STAT. § 12.40.110 (Supp. 1987) (before grand jury only); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (Supp. 1987) (criminal and civil proceedings); ARK. R. 
EVID. 803(25)(A) (1988) (criminal); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1228 (West 1987) (enu-
merated crimes; statement must have been memorialized in writing by law enforce-
ment official and comes in only out of presence of jury and to corroborate 
confession, so as to make it admissible); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129 (Supp. 
1986) (criminal, delinquency, or civil proceedings) (see also id. § 18-3-411(3) (crimi-
nal»; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(23) (Supp. 1987) (civil or criminal); ILL. ANN. 
STAT. ch. 37, § 704-6(4)(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) (civil and juvenile); ILL. ANN. 
STAT. ch. 38, § 115-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) (criminal); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
37-4-6 (Burns 1985 & Supp. 1987) (enumerated crimes); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 232.96(6) (West 1985) (written or taped statement, made by certain social serv-
ices, hospital, or law enforcement personnel, relating to a child alleged to be in need 
of assistance); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 6O-460(dd) (1983 & Supp. 1987) (criminal, juve-
nile, or child-in-need-of-care proceeding); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 
(Supp. 1987) (criminal; statement was made under oath, in presence of judge or 
justice, and recorded); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.156 (West Supp. 1987) (depen-
dency or neglect proceeding or proceeding regarding termination of parental rights); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02, subd. 3 (West Supp. 1987) (including mentally im-
paired individuals); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-403 (Supp. 1987) (statement made in 
order to prevent recurrence of abuse or obtain advice about psychological, social or 
familial consequences); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.075 (Vernon Supp. 1987); NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 51.385 (1985) (criminal); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.46 (West Supp. 
1987) (abuse or neglect proceeding); N.Y. JUD.-FAM. CT. LAW § 1046(a)(vi) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1987) (child protective proceedings); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 
§ 2803.1 (West Supp. 1987) (criminal and juvenile proceedings); PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 5986 (Purdon Supp. 1987) (dependency proceedings); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 14-1-69 (Supp. 1987) (spontaneous statement; custody or termination trial); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-38 (1987) (criminal or dependency, neglect, or de-
linquency proceedings); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.072 (Vernon Supp. 
1987) (enumerated crimes; first statement only, made to an adult); TEX. FAM. CODE 
ANN. § 54.031 (Vernon 1986) (juvenile delinquency); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411 
(Supp. 1987) (criminal); VT. R. EVID. 804a (Supp. 1987) (enumerated crimes or 
juvenile proceeding; statement not taken in preparation for a legal proceeding and 
must be made prior to defendant's initial appearance before judicial officer); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1987) (criminal or juvenile proceedings). 
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be unavailable to testify.6s Another, exemplified by the Washington stat-
ute, allows any reliable out-of-court statement of the child to be admit-
65. The California and Maine statutes contain the same requirement. See CAL. EVID. 
CODE § 1228 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 (Supp. 1987). The 
Kansas statute provides: 
Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a witness while testi-
fying at the hearing, offered to prove the truth of the matter stated, is 
hearsay evidence and inadmissible except: 
(dd) Actions involving children. In a criminal proceeding or a pro-
ceeding pursuant to the Kansas juvenile offender's code or in a proceeding 
to determine if a child is a child in need of care under the Kansas code for 
care of children, a statement made by a child, to prove the crime or that a 
child is a juvenile offender. or a child in need of care, if: 
(1) The child is alleged to be a victim of the crime or offense or a 
child in need of care; and 
(2) the trial judge finds, after a hearing on the matter, that the child 
is disqualified or unavailable as a witness, the statement is apparently relia-
ble and the child was not induced to make the statement falsely by use of 
threats or promises. 
If a statement is admitted pursuant to this subsection in a trial to a 
jury, the trial judge shall instruct the jury that it is for the jury to deter-
mine the weight and credit to be given the statement and that, in making 
the determination, it shall consider the age and maturity of the child, the 
nature of the statement, the circumstances under which the statement was 
made, any possible threats or promises that might have been made to the 
child to obtain the statement and any other relevant factor. 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 6O-460(dd) (Supp. 1987). 
As to what constitutes unavailability, see supra notes 40 and 46 and infra note 
66. For a suggested definition of unavailability, see the following model statute 
(which does not condition admissibility of the hearsay on the child's unavailability) 
from Eatman & Bulkley, PROTECTING CHILD VICTIM WITNESSES: SAMPLE LAWS 
AND MATERIALS, at 5-6, ABA Nat'l Legal Resource Center on Child Advocacy 
and Protection (1986): 
(A) An out-of-court statement made by a child under [eleven] years of age 
at the time of the proceeding concerning an act that is a material 
element of the offense[s] of [sexual abuse], [physical abuse or battery], 
[other specified offenses] that is not otherwise admissible in evidence 
is admissible in any judicial proceeding if the requirements of sections 
B through F are met. 
(B) An out-of-court statement may be admitted as provided in section A 
if: 
(1) the child testifies at the proceeding, or testifies by means of video-
taped deposition (in accordance with [ __ ]) or closed-circuit tel-
evision (in accordance with [ __ ]), and at the time of such 
testimony is subject to cross-examination about the out-of-court 
statement; or 
(2) (a) the child is found by the court to be unavailable to testify on 
any of these grounds: 
i) the child's death; 
ii) the child's absence from the jurisdiction; 
iii) the child's total failure of memory; 
iv) the child's persistent refusal to testify despite judicial re-
quests to do so; 
v) the child's physical or mental disability; 
vi) the existence of a privilege involving the child; 
vii) the child's incompetency, including the child's inability 
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ted, regardless of whether the child testifies or is unavailable to testify.66 
and 
to communicate about the offense because of fear or a 
similar reason; or 
viii) substantial likelihood that the child would suffer severe 
emotional trauma from testifying at the proceeding or by 
means of videotaped deposition or closed-circuit 
television; 
(b) the child's out-of-court statement is shown to possess particu-
larized guarantees of trustworthiness. 
(C) A finding of unavailability under section B(2)(a)(viii) must be 
supported by expert testimony. 
(D) The proponent of the statement must inform the adverse party of 
the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the content 
of the statement sufficiently in advance of the proceeding to pro-
vide the defendant with a fair opportunity to prepare a response 
to the statement before the proceeding at which it is offered. 
(E) In determining whether a statement possesses particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness under section B(2), the court may 
consider, but is not limited to, the following factors: 
(I) the child's personal knowledge of the event; 
(2) the age and maturity of the child; 
(3) certainty that the statement was made, including the credi-
bility of the person testifying about the statement; 
(4) any apparent motive the child may have to falsify or distort 
the event, including bias, corruption, or coercion; 
(5) the timing of the child's statement; 
(6) whether more than one person heard the statement; 
(7) whether the child was suffering pain or distress when mak-
ing the statement; 
(8) the nature and duration of any alleged abuse; 
(9) whether the child's young age makes it unlikely that the 
child fabricated a statement that represents a graphic, de-
tailed account beyond the child's knowledge and experience; 
(10) whether the statement has a "ring of verity," has internal 
consistency or coherence, and uses terminology appropriate 
to the child's age; 
(11) whether the statement is spontaneous or directly responsive 
to questions; 
(12) whether the statement is suggestive due to improperly lead-
ing questions; 
(13) whether extrinsic evidence exists to show the defendant's 
opportunity to commit the act complained of in the child's 
statement. 
(F) The court shall support with findings on the record any rulings 
pertaining to the child's unavailability and the trustworthiness of 
the out-of-court statement. 
66. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1987) provides: 
A statement made by a child when under the age of ten describing any act 
of sexual contact performed with or on the child by another, not otherwise 
admissible by statute or court rule, is admissible in evidence in dependency 
proceedings under Title 13 RCW and criminal proceedings in the courts of 
the state of Washington if: 
(1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of 
the jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement pro-
vide sufficient indicia of reliability; and 
(2) The child either: 
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The statutes adopted and other proposals which have been made also 
take varying approaches with regard to the factors to be considered in 
assessing the reliability of the statement, the need for corroborative evi-
dence, the discoverability of the statement by the defense, and other pro-
cedural matters. A third type of statute provides for the admission of 
only videotaped statements. 67 
A. Admissibility Dependent on Declarant's Unavailability or 
Regardless of Declarant's Ability to Testify 
Most statutes adopted by other states follow the pattern of the 
Washington statute and do not condition admissibility of out-of-court 
statements by child abuse victims on the child's unavailability to testify. 
The Kansas statute differs in that it creates a hearsay exception for relia-
ble out-of-court statements by the child victim only if the child cannot 
testify at trial. This differentation is due in part perhaps to the peculiar-
ity of Kansas law, under which all reliable hearsay is admissible in civil 
cases if the declarant is available to testify at trial. 68 
The Washington statute admits statements preliminarily determined 
by the judge, outside the hearing of the jury, to be reliable, even if the 
(a) Testifies at the proceedings; or 
(b) Is unavailable as a witness: Provided, That when the child is 
unavailable as a witness, such statement may be admitted only if 
there is corroborative evidence of the act. 
A statement may not be admitted under this section unless the propo-
nent of the statement makes known to the adverse party his intention to 
offer the statement and the particulars of the statement sufficiently in ad-
vance of the proceedings to provide the adverse party with a fair opportu-
nity to prepare to meet the statement. 
The Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Utah statutes take this approach. See 
statutes cited supra note 64. The Florida statute defines unavailability. See FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 90.804(1) (1986). Section 595.02, subdivision 3 of the Minnesota 
Statutes provides, "[A]n unavailable witness includes an incompetent witness." 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02, subd. 3 (West Supp. 1987). See also State v. Gitchel, 
41 Wash. App. 820, 825-26, 706 P.2d 1091, 1095 (1985) (three-year-old's incompe-
tency, in that" 'nothing of substance could be obtained from her in the way of 
testimony,' " was "the equivalent of unavailability") and supra note 65. 
On the other hand, the Illinois criminal statute requires the child to testify. 
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987). The Alaska statute 
requires that the child be available at trial. ALASKA STAT. § 12.40.110 (Supp. 
1987). The Vermont rule also requires the child to be available, and on motion of 
either party, to testify for the state. VT. R. EVID. 804a (Supp. 1987). The Texas 
statutes require the child to testify or to be available to testify. TEX. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 38.072 (Vernon Supp. 1987); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.031 
(Vernon 1986). . 
67. See infra text accompanying notes 86-89 (also addressing statutes providing for ad-
missibility of videotaped testimony and live testimony over closed-circuit television). 
68. Section 6O-460(a) of the Kansas Statutes Annotated permits the admission of "[a] 
statement previously made by a person who is present at the hearing and available 
for cross-examination with respect to the statement and its subject matter, provided 
the statement would be admissible if made by the declarant while testifying as a 
witness." 
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child is also testifying to his present recollection at trial. 69 This approach 
is preferable because the jury will have the benefit of reliable out-of-court 
statements by the child when the child's memory was fresher. These out-
of-court statements may well be more probative than the child's trial tes-
timony.70 Also, the admission of such statements in child abuse cases, as 
in rape cases, could forestall questions in the jurors' minds about whether 
the victim's testimony was the result of prodding or suggestion by others, 
such as social workers, police, and prosecutors.7 1 
Most of the hearsay exceptions, besides the 1988 Act, that are recog-
nized in Maryland (and twenty-four of the twenty-nine recognized in fed-
eral court) apply regardless of whether the person who made the out-of-
court statement is available or unavailable to testify. Finally, it may be 
easier to imagine that a child who is ruled competent at trial has also 
uttered a reliahle out-of-court statement than it is to imagine that an 
"incompetent" child has made a prior reliable statement. 72 
69. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1987). See also Graham, supra note 
44, at 48-49 (proposing specific language for hearsay exception applicable if victim is 
either available or unavailable). 
70. See State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, 21-22, 697 P.2d 836, 841 (1985) (child's out-of-
court statements have potentially superior trustworthiness to a child's in-court testi-
mony); Berliner & Barbieri, The Testimony o/the Child Victim o/Sexual Assault, 40 
J. SOCIAL ISSUES 125, 133 (1984); Goodman & Helgeson, Child Sexual Assault: 
Children's Memory and the Law, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 181,203-04; Skoler, supra 
note 39, at 6, 37-38, 46; Note, Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay State-
ments, supra note 25, at 1750-52; Note, Justification for a New Hearsay Exception, 
supra note 29, at 181 & nn. 47-49; Note, The Testimony 0/ Child Victims in Sex 
Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806, 807, 817 n. 
80 (1980); Note, Unthinkable Hearsay Exceptions, supra note 24, at 439 & nn. 8 & 
10. Cf 3 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 738, at 91 (1970) (no failure of 
witness' present recollection need be shown in order for writing to be admitted 
under hearsay exception for past recollection recorded, "because, for every moment 
of time which elapses between the act of recording and the occasion of testifying, the 
actual recollection must be inferior .... "). 
71. See Park, McCormick on Evidence and the Concept 0/ Hearsay: A Critical Analysis 
Followed by Suggestions to Law Teachers, 65 MINN. L. REV. 423, 441 (1981) (argu-
ing that out-of-court statement by child sexual abuse victim in Bridges v. State, 247 
Wis. 350, 19 N.W.2d 529 (1945), describing defendant's home, should have been 
admitted under principle applicable to prompt reports of rape). 
72. Of course, it is possible - though not by any means inevitable - that a child who is 
found incompetent to testify at trial may have made a reliable statement before trial. 
See State v. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d 308, 314 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (out-of-court 
statements by victim who was later found incompetent were reliable). Explanations 
for this result include the child's failure to appreciate the trial process or the mean-
ing of the oath or the child's failure to remember. In fact, for therapeutic reasons, 
repression is often sought by psychotherapists treating young child sexual abuse 
victims. See supra note 37. 
Under the current law. statements of children who are incompetent to testify at 
trial may come in if they fit within, for example. the hearsay exception for excited 
utterances. McLAIN, supra note 13, § 803.1, at 341 and nn. 9, 10. See People v. 
Orduno, 80 Cal. App. 3d 738, 145 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1978). But see State v. 
Segerburg, 131 Conn. 546, 41 A.2d 101 (1945) (reversible error to admit out-of-
court statement of child too immature to testify; state failed to present even corrobo-
rative physical evidence). See generally Myers, supra note 1, at 911-14. 
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B. Requirement of and Criteria for Establishing 
Reliability of Statements 
19 
In order to ensure the constitutionality of statutes establishing hear-
say exceptions for statements of child abuse victims, most of the statutes 
adopted and proposed explicitly condition admissibility on the trial 
court's finding that a proffered statement is reliable. 73 Some simply in-
corporate a general requirement of reliability; others list factors to be 
considered by the trial court in determining whether that requirement is 
met. 74 
73. The Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Da-
kota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Washington statutes, cited supra note 64, so pro-
vide. See generally Bulkley, supra note 46, at 654-55; Goodman & Helgeson, supra 
note 70, at 181-201 (suggesting how best to interview victims); MacFarlane, Diag-
nostic Evaluations and the Use of Videotapes in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. 
MIAMI. L. REV. 135, 154-61 (1985) (semble); Note, Comprehensive Approach to 
Child Hearsay Statements, supra note 25, at 1745, 1751-53. 
One commentator suggests that a statement should be excluded if there is "any 
suggestion of bias, selective reinforcement or 'programming,' disposition to color or 
stray from the truth, disability of perception [or] tendency to fantasize or exaggerate 
.... " McNeil, supra note 44, at 281 (footnotes omitted). 
74. When compiled, the criteria suggested by various legislatures, courts, commenta-
tors, and organizations include the following: 
(a) The declarant's personal knowledge of the event; 
(b) remoteness of the possibility of declarant's faulty recollection; 
(c) certainty that the statement was made, including the credibility of the 
person testifying about the statement; 
(d) any apparent motive to lie or partiality by the declarant, including 
interest, bias, corruption, or coercion; 
(e) the general character or credibility of the declarant; 
(f) whether more than one person heard the statement; 
(g) whether the statement is spontaneous or directly responsive to 
questions; 
(h) the timing of the statement; 
(i) the relationship between the witness and the declarant; 
G) if the statement represents a graphic, detailed account of sexual behav-
ior, whether the child's age, knowledge, and experience make it un-
likely that the child fabricated; 
(k) the nature and duration of the abuse; 
(I) the relationship of the declarant and defendant; 
(m) whether the statement has a "ring of verity," inner consistency and 
coherence, and contains terminology appropriate to the child's age; 
(n) whether the child was suffering pain or distress when making the 
statement; 
(0) whether extrinsic evidence exists to show that the abusive act occurred 
and that the defendant had the opportunity to commit the act; 
(p) whether leading questions or other suggestive techniques were used in 
eliciting the statement; 
(q) the age and maturity of the child; and 
(r) whether the witness to whom the statement was made had received 
training in interviewing child victims. 
See, e.g., ARK. R. EVID. 803(25)(A)(I) (1988); State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 
159, 164 (S.D. 1984); ABA Nat'l Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and 
Protection, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING LEGAL INTERVENTION IN IN-
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C. Corroboration Requirement 
A statute creating a hearsay exception addresses only the admissibil-
ity of one piece of evidence in the state's case. It does not address the 
sufficiency of all of the evidence in a particular case to withstand a mo-
tion for acquittal or to support a conviction.75 That evidence would 
probably include expert and parental testimony regarding the child's 
physical and emotional trauma. It seems highly unlikely that a prosecu-
tor would proceed to trial only on the basis of an uncorroborated out-of-
court statement of a child victim.76 
. Nonetheless, because of the legislators' desire to preclude an ac-
cused's conviction based only on the out-of-court statement of a victim 
who is unavailable to testify at trial (which would likely be found to have 
deprived the accused of due process),77 some other states' statutes explic-
TRAFAMILY CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES at 34 (J. Bulkleyed. 1982) [hereinafter 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING LEGAL INTERVENTION IN INTRAFAMILY 
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES] 
A child victim's out-of-court statement of sexual abuse should be ad-
missible into evidence where it does not qualify under an existing hearsay 
exception, as long as: (1) the child testifies; or (2) in the event the child 
does not testify, there is other corroborative evidence of the abuse. Before 
admitting such a statement into evidence, the judge should determine 
whether the general purposes of the evidence rules and interests of justice 
will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. In addi-
tion, the court should consider the age and maturity of the child, the na-
ture and duration of the abuse, the relationship of the child to the offender, 
the reliability of the assertion, and the reliability of the child witness in 
deciding whether to admit such a statement. 
Eatman & Bulkley, model statute, supra note 65; Bulkley, supra note 46, at 655; 
Myers, supra note 1, at 896-905. 
The best approach is to encourage the court, in assessing the reliability of prof-
fered hearsay, to consider all relevant circumstances, including, but not limited to, 
those listed above. See Eatman & Bulkley, supra note 65, model statute at subsec-
tion E. See also, e.g., United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1444-45 (8th Cir. 
1986) ("[I]n assessing the trustworthiness of an out-of-court statement, we must 
examine the reliability of the declaration 'in light of the circumstances at the time of 
the declaration and the credibility of the declarant.''' (citing United States v. 
Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (1985». The panel majority found no abuse of discretion in 
the trial court's admission of the five-year-old victim's statement to her emergency 
foster mother, despite the fact that the child had made prior inconsistent statements, 
when it was unlikely that the child could have fabricated the story, the child's inter-
viewers had received training in interviewing children and in the use of anatomically 
correct dolls, they testified that they had been careful not to lead the child, and 
defense counsel questioned them about the prior statements). See also supra note 
63. 
75. See generally McLAIN, supra note 13, § 300.4. 
76. See Note, The Effects 0/ the Abolition 0/ the Corroboration Requirement in Child 
Sexual Assault Cases, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 793, 794 (1987) ("Despite formal aboli-
tion [in the District of Columbia], corroboration remains an essential element in the 
successful prosecution of child sexual abuse cases because of the nature of the 
offense."). 
77. Eatman & Bulkley, supra note 65, at 9; McNeil, supra note 44, at 282-83; Skoler, 
supra note 39, at 9-10, 30-31. See also State v. Segerburg, 131 Conn. 546, 41 A.2d 
101 (1945); Myers, supra note 1, at 814-18. 
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itly require corroborative evidence.78 For example, the Washington stat-
ute requires corroborative evidence of the abusive act in order for an out-
of-court statement of an unavailable declarant to be admissible. 79 
Because it is unnecessary and unduly restrictive to condition admis-
sibility of the hearsay on the existence of corroborative evidence, a state 
wishing to provide such protection to a defendant should provide explic-
itly instead that there may be no conviction absent the desired 
corroboration. 80 
78. The Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Minnesota (§ 595.02, subd. 3(b)(II», Mis-
sissippi, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington statutes so provide. See 
statutes cited supra note 64. The Alaska statute also conditions admissibility on the 
existence of corroborative evidence. ALASKA STAT. § 12.40.110 (Supp. 1987). 
Under the Illinois civil statute, uncorroborated hearsay will not support a finding of 
abuse and neglect. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987). 
The New Jersey and New York civil statutes include similar provisions. See N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.46 (West Supp. 1987); N.Y. JUD.-FAM. CT. LAW § 1046(a)(vi) 
(McKinney Supp. 1987). See generally Bulkley, Introduction: Background and 
Overview of Child Sexual Abuse: Law Reforms in the Mid-1980's, 40 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 5, 5, 12 (1985); Graham, supra note 44, at 58-61; Myers, The Child Witness: 
Techniques for Direct Examination. Cross-Examination. and Impeachment, 18 PAC. 
L.J. 801, 853-57 (1987). 
79. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1987). The same position is taken in 
New York's Family Court Act. N.Y. JUD.-FAM. CT. LAW § 1046(a)(vi) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1987). It is also endorsed by a research group, which urges that there be 
no requirement of corroborative evidence if the victim testifies, and points out that 
such a requirement, almost universally abandoned by American jurisdictions today, 
was based on several misconceptions. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING 
LEGAL INTERVENTION IN INTRAFAMILY CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES, supra 
note 74, at 32-33. The same group recommends that, if the victim does not testify, 
"corroborative evidence of the abuse" should be required. Id. at 34. 
Such corroborative evidence could include evidence of physical trauma or ve-
nereal disease. Note, Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements, supra 
note 25, at 1766 n.188 (1983). See State v. Gitchel, 41 Wash. App. 820, 706 P.2d 
1091, 1096 (1985) (physical evidence of penetration, child's inappropriate behavior 
during medical examination, and nightmares). It has been suggested that corrobo-
rative evidence could also include expert psychological testimony that the child was 
abused. Myers, supra note 1, at 911. See also State v. Spronk, 379 N.W.2d 312 (S.D. 
1985) (physical examinations, by mother and grandmother, and psychological as-
sessments and profiles of child by social worker). 
If corroboration of the identity of the abuser is required as well, it might be 
provided by "eyewitness testimony, a confession, evidence that the alleged assailant 
had the opportunity to commit the offense, or verification of the child's description 
of the assailant's clothing or possessions at the scene of the offense." Note, The 
Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 
98 HARV. L. REV. 806, 821 (1985); see also supra note 61. 
One commentator urges a requirement of corroborative evidence, even if the 
child victim is available to testify, that the child's physical condition was consistent 
with the truth of the child's out-of-court statement and that the defendant had the 
opportunity to commit the alleged abuse and, if the child is unavailable to testify, 
that the abuse occurred and that the defendant was the only person who had oppor-
tunity to commit it. Comment, Sexual Abuse of Children - Washington's New 
Hearsay Exception, 58 WASH. L. REV. 813, 827-28 (1983). 
80. Bulkley, supra note 46, at 650-51. 
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D. Discoverability of the Statement and Other Procedural Matters 
Statutes adopted in several other states require that the reliability of 
the child's out-of-court statement be determined by the trial judge 
outside the presence of the jury.81 Considerations of judicial economy 
dictate that such a determination be made at a pretrial hearing, because 
the prosecution may have to drop the charges if the statement is ruled 
inadmissible. Requirements of fairness and practicality would mandate 
that if such an approach is followed, as in the state of Washington, the 
defense must be given "the particulars of the statement sufficiently in 
advance of the proceedings to provide the adverse party with a fair op-
portunity to meet the statement."82 
If the court decides that the statement is reliable and admits it into 
evidence at trial, the witness to whom the child made the statement (and 
the child, if available to testify), may be cross-examined as to all the cir-
cumstances under which the statement was made. 83 Even if the child 
does not testify, he may be impeached.84 In either event, the defense can 
then argue to the jury that, although the statement has been admitted 
into evidence, it is entitled to little or no weight. 
The jury may be instructed that it must consider all relevant circum-
stances in assessing what weight, if any, to give to the out-of-court state-
ment. The Kansas statute's requirement of a specific jury instruction has 
been justly criticized as too inflexible and potentially confusing, however, 
because it lists details which mayor may not be relevant to a particular 
81. The Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Minnesota 
(§ 595.02, subd. 3), Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Dakota, 
Texas, and Washington statutes so provide. See statutes cited supra note 64. The 
Indiana statute requires the child to attend the hearing. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-
4-6 (Burns 1985 & Supp. 1987). 
82. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1987). The Arizona, Arkansas, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada (if the 
child is unable or unavailable to testify), Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Utah 
statutes similarly provide. See statutes cited supra note 64. Some set a fixed time 
period often days' notice. See also State V. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159, 164 (S.D. 
1984); RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING LEGAL INTERVENTION IN IN-
TRAFAMILY CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES, supra note 74, at 34 ("A statement may 
only be admitted under this exception if the proponent of it makes known to the 
adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse 
party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the state-
ment and the particulars of it."). Uniform Rule of Evidence 807 merely provides 
for all parties to have an opportunity to, view the (audiovisually recorded) statement 
and be given a transcript of it before it is offered into evidence. See UNIF. R. EVID. 
807(d), 13A U.L.A. 64 (1986). 
It should be pointed out, too, that the United States Supreme Court has stated 
that the confrontation clause is not "a constitutionally-compelled rule of pretrial 
discovery." Pennsylvania V. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. 989, 999 (1987) (plurality) (defend-
ant is entitled only to in camera review by trial court of state agency's confidential 
investigatory child abuse files, not to have defense counsel have access to files). 
83. The procedure is analogous to that followed with regard to the determination of 
voluntariness of confessions in criminal cases. See generally McLAIN, supra note 
13, § 104.2 at 72 & n.7. 
84. See id. § 806.1; Myers, supra note 78, at 941. 
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case.85 
E. Videotaped Statements, Videotaped Depositions, and Live 
Testimony Over Closed-Circuit Television 
23 
A number of states have passed statutes providing for the admissi-
bility of only videotaped ex parte statements or interviews of child vic-
tims.86 Several have adopted hearsay exceptions for videotaped 
testimony of the child, during which the defense has had the opportunity 
85. McNeil, supra note 44, at 283-84. The following language of the Arkansas statute, 
virtually identical to the Colorado statute is preferable: 
If a statement is admitted pursuant to this Section the Court shall 
instruct the jury that it is for the jury to determine the weight and credit to 
be given the statement and that, in making the determination, it shall con-
sider the age and maturity of the child, the nature of the statement, the 
circumstances under which the statement was made, and any other rele-
vant factors. 
ARK. R. EVID. 803(25)(A) (1988). 
86. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4252 (Supp. 1987); HAWAII R. EVID. 616;' KAN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3433, 38-1557, 38-1657 (Supp. 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. 
§ 421.350(2) (Baldwin Supp. 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 440.1 to 440.5 (West 
Supp, 1987), construed in, State v. Feazell, 486 So.2d 327 (La. App. 1986), cert. 
denied, 491 So.2d 20 (1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 492.304 (Vernon Supp. 1987); N.Y. 
CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 190.30.4, 190.32 (McKinney Supp. 1988) (grand jury); R.I. 
GEN, LAWS §§ 14-1-68,40-11-7.2 (Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-116(c) 
(Supp. 1986); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.071(2) (Vernon Supp. 1987); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5 (Supp. 1987); WIS. R. EVID. 908.08 (Supp. 1987). 
Compare Long v. State, 694 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. App. 5th Dist. 1985) (right to call 
child victim at trial and cross-examine her insufficient to rectify violation of defend-
ant's confrontation right by admission of videotaped interview at which neither de-
fendant nor defense counsel could be present) with Alexander v. State, 692 S.W.2d 
563 (Tex. App. 11th Dist. 1985) (Texas statute does not violate accused's confronta-
tion or due process rights) and Jolly v. State, 681 S.W.2d 689, 695 (Tex. App. 14th 
Dist. 1984) (no violation of confrontation right when accused chose not to call avail-
able victim to cross-examine her). See generally Bulkley, supra note 78, at 9; 
Eatman, Videotaping Interviews with Child Sex Offense Victims, 7 CHILDREN'S 
LEGAL RIGHTS J. at 13 (1986); Graham, supra note 44, at 67 (videotaped interview 
made in anticipation of litigation is unreliable); MacFarlane, supra note 73, at 143-
46 (arguing that videotaped interviews cannot be used at trial as substantive evi-
dence, except perhaps for corroboration of interviewer's testimony or to show 
trauma requiring special protection); Note, Videotaping the Testimony of an Abused 
Child: Necessary Protection for the Child or Unwarranted Compromise of the De-
fendant'S Constitutional Rights?, 3 UTAH L. REV. 461 (1986). 
Subsection (a) of Uniform Rule of Evidence 807 sets forth a conservative hear-
say exception, under which a child's trustworthy statements recorded audio-visually 
may be admitted at trial if particular requirements are met. These include the 
court's finding that the child would suffer "severe emotional or psychological harm 
if required to testify in open court." Subsection (b) provides, nevertheless, that at 
the defendant's request the child shall be subject to further questioning "in such 
manner as the court may direct" and, failing that, the audio-visual statement will be 
inadmissible. Subsection (c) further provides that any party may call the child as a 
witness "if the interests of justice so require." Subsection (d), somewhat analogous 
to MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1987), gives the judge the 
option to allow the child's testimony to be given over closed-circuit television or by 
deposition recorded audio-visually. The Uniform Rule, proposed in 1986 by the 
Uniform Law Commissioners, provides: 
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. to cross-examine. 87 Some states provide for the admissibility of the 
(a) A hearsay statement made by a minor who is under the age of 
[12] years at the time of trial describing an act of sexual conduct or physi-
cal violence performed by or with another on or with that minor or any 
[other person] [parent, sibling or member of the familial household of the 
minor] is not excluded by the hearsay rule if, on motion of a party, the 
minor, or the court and following a hearing [in camera], the court finds 
that (i) there is a substantial likelihood that the minor will suffer severe 
emotional or psychological harm if required to testify in open court; (ii) 
the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; (iii) the statement was accu-
rately recorded by audio-visual means; (iv) the audio-visual record dis-
closes the identity and at all times includes the images and voices of all 
persons present during the interview of the minor; (v) the statement was 
not made in response to questioning calculated to lead the minor to make 
a particular statement or is clearly shown to be the minor's statement and 
not the product of improper suggestion; (vi) the person conducting the 
interview of the minor is available at trial for examination or cross-exami-
nation by any party; and (vii) before the recording is offered into evidence, 
all parties are afforded an opportunity to view it and are furnished a copy 
of a written transcript of it. 
(b) Before a statement may be admitted in evidence pursuant to sub-
section (a) in a criminal case, the court shall, at the request of the defend-
ant, provide for further questioning of the minor in such manner as the 
court may direct. If the minor refuses to respond to further questioning or 
is otherwise unavailable, the statement made pursuant to subsection (a) is 
not admissible under this rule. 
(c) The admission in evidence of a statement of a minor pursuant to 
subsection (a) does not preclude the court from permitting any party to 
call the minor as a witness if the interests of justice so require. 
(d) In any proceeding in which a minor under the age of [12] years 
may be called as a witness to testify concerning an act of sexual conduct or 
physical violence performed by or with another on or with that minor or 
any [other person] [parent, sibling or member of the familial household of 
the minor], if the court finds that there is a substantial likelihood that the 
minor will suffer severe emotional or psychological harm if required to 
testify in open court, the court may, on motion of a party, the minor or the 
court, order that the testimony of the minor be taken by deposition re-
corded by audio-visual means or by contemporaneous examination and 
cross-examination in another place under the supervision of the trial judge 
and communicated to the courtroom by closed-circuit television. Only the 
judge, the attorneys for the parties, the parties, persons necessary to oper-
ate the equipment and any person the court finds would contribute to the 
welfare and well-being of the minor may be present during the minor's 
testimony. If the court finds that placing the minor and one or more ofthe 
parties in the same room during the testimony of the minor would contrib-
ute to the likelihood that the minor will suffer severe emotional or psycho-
logical harm, the court shall order that the parties be situated so that they 
may observe and hear the testimony of the minor and may consult with 
their attorneys, but the court shall ensure that the minor cannot see or 
hear them, except, within the discretion of the court, for purposes of 
identification. 
UNIF. R. EVID. 807, 13A U.L.A. 64, 65 (1986). 
87. These inclUde ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.047 (1984); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West 
1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413 (1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3434, 38-
1558, 38-1658 (Supp. 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (Baldwin Supp. 
1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16D (West Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. 
1987] Hearsay Exception for Child Abuse Victims 25 
child's live testimony at trial over closed-circuit television. 88 
Maryland, in section 9-102 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings 
article of its annotated code, previously has made provision for limited 
use of closed-circuit television.89 That statute, however, is different in 
ANN. § 595.02, subd. 4 (West Supp. 1987); MIss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-407 (Supp. 
1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-401 to 403 (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 
(1987); N.M.R. CRIM. P. DIST. CTs. 5-504 (1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2151.35.11 (Supp. 1987); id. §§ 2907.41, 2937.11, 2945.49 (1987); R.1. GEN. 
LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9 (Supp. 
1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-116(d)-(f) (Supp. 1987); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE 
ANN. § 38-071 (Vernon Supp. 1987); VT. R. EVID. 807(d) (Supp. 1987); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 967.04(7) (West Supp. 1987). See also UNIF. R. EVID. 807(d), supra note 
86. See generally Eatman & Bulkley, supra note 65, at 1, 17-36; Bulkley, supra note 
46, at 655-64; Graham, supra note 44, at 62-76, 91-93; Mylniec & Dally, See No 
Evil? Can Insulation of Child Sexual Abuse Victims Be Accomplished Without En-
dangering the Defendant's Constitutional Rights?, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 115 (1985); 
Skoler, supra note 39, at 10-14, 18-22,24-27; Thompson, The Use of Modem Tech-
nology to Present Evidence in Child Sex Abuse Prosecutions: A Sixth Amendment 
Analysis and Perspective, 18 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 1 (1987); Symposium on Family 
and Children, 3 UTAH L. REV. 439 (1986) (including Note, Videotaping the Testi-
mony of an Abused Child: Necessary Protection for the Child or Unwarranted Com-
promise of the Defendant's Constitutional Rights?, supra note 86, at 461); Note, 
Videotaping Children's Testimony: An Empirical View, 85 MICH. L. REV. 809 
(1987); Comment, Children's Testimony in Sexual Abuse Cases: Ohio's Proposed 
Legislation, 19 AKRON L. REV. 441 (1986); Comment, The Young Victim as Witness 
for the Prosecution: Another Form of Abuse?, 89 DICK. L. REV. 721 (1985); Note, 
Videotaped Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: United States v. Binder, 23 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 193 (1987). 
88. See the Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, 
Utah, and Vermont statutes, cited supra note 87, and UNIF. R. EVID. 807(d), 13A 
U.L.A. 64, 65 (1986). Statutes providing only for closed-circuit television include 
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86g 
(1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:283 (West Supp. 1987); MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. 
CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-405 (Supp. 1987); and 
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 65.00-65.30 (McKinney Supp. 1988). See generally, 
Comment, Closed Circuit Television Testimony for Sexually Abused Children: The 
Right to Avoid Confrontation?, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 117 (1987). 
89. Section 9-102 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings article of the Maryland Anno-
tated Code provides: 
(a)(I) In a case of abuse ofa child as defined in § 5-901 of the Family Law 
article or article 27, § 35A of the Code, a court may order that the 
testimony of a child victim be taken outside the courtroom and 
shown in the courtroom by means of closed circuit television if: 
(i) The testimony is taken during the proceeding; and 
(ii) The judge determines that testimony by the child victim in the 
courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional 
distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate. 
(2) Only the prosecuting attorney, the attorney for the defendant, and 
the judge may question the child. 
(3) The operators of the closed circuit television shall make every effort 
to be unobtrusive. 
(b)(1) Only the following persons may be in the room with the child when 
the child testifies by closed circuit television: 
(i) The prosecuting attorney; 
(ii) The attorney for the defendant; 
(iii) The operators of the closed circuit television equipment; and 
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kind from the 1988 Act, because section 9-102 does not address the ad-
missibility of the child's pretrial statement. 
Videotaped ex parte statements are subject to several criticisms. 
First, the videotaped statement is unlikely to be the child's first statement 
regarding the abuse and may not be the most reliable. Second, videotap-
ing equipment and expertise may be unavailable in many areas. Third, 
although proponents of a videotaping requirement argue that videotaping 
will provide a better record that will disclose, for example, improper 
questioning of the child by an interviewer, videotaping will not preclude 
"rehearsal" prior to "show time." 
Statutes providing for the admissibility of videotaped testimony, 
such as deposition testimony, are generally passed with the apparent ob-
jective of saving the child victim from being traumatized again by exami-
nation at trial. If the child is available to testify at trial, however, denial 
of the defendant's right to cross-examine the child at trial- even though 
the defense had the opportunity to cross-examine at deposition - would 
likely violate the confrontation clause. If the child is unavailable to tes-
tify at trial, a restriction on admissibility of the child's out-of-court state-
ments such that only the child's videotaped testimony is admissible 
would be far stricter than the Constitution requires. 
V. MARYLAND'S NEW EXCEPTION 
In its 1988 session, the Maryland General Assembly adopted a hear-
say exception for certain reliable out-of-court statements of child abuse 
victims, to be codified as section 9-103.1 of the Courts and Judicial Pro-
(iv) Unless the defendant objects, any person whose presence, in 
the opinion of the court, contributes to the well-being of the 
child, including a person who has dealt with the child in a 
therapeutic setting concerning the abuse. 
(2) During the child's testimony by closed circuit television, the judge 
and the defendant shall be in the courtroom. 
(3) The judge and the defendant shall be allowed to communicate with 
the persons in the room where the child is testifying by any appro-
priate electronic method. 
(c) The provisions of this section do not apply if the defendant is an attor-
ney pro se. 
(d) This section may not be interpreted to preclude, for purposes of identi-
fication of a defendant, the presence of both the victim and the defend-
ant in the courtroom at the same time. 
MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1987). See Wildermuth v. 
State, 310 Md. 496,. 530 A.2d 275 (1987) (upholding statute as constitutional, but 
remanding one case because record did not support finding that victim's testifying in 
open court would "result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that 
the child cannot reasonably communicate"). Cf Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S.Ct. 
2658 (1987) (accused's confrontation right was not violated by state's barring him, 
but not his counsel, from pretrial hearing on whether child sexual abuse victims 
were competent to testify at trial). See generally McLAIN, supra note 13, 
§ 803(26).1; Cleaveland, Closed Circuit Television/or Victims o/Child Abuse, 16 U. 
BALT. L. FORUM 18 (Spring 1986). 
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ceedings article of the Maryland Annotated Code.90 This new exception 
is not restricted to videotaped statements91 and, like the Washington 
state statute,92 applies even when the child is available to testify. The 
1988 Act has many good features and is a positive step. 
The 1988 Act is, however, underinclusive. The statute exhibits a 
conservative legislative approach both to the kinds of proceedings to 
which the exception applies and to the types of professions in which a 
witness who testifies to a child's out-of-court statement must be engaged. 
Finally, the hearsay exception does not apply when the child is incompe-
tent to testify. 
This section of this article will review the statute's provisions re-
garding (1) the types of proceedings to which it applies; (2) its restriction 
to statements of child victims under the age of twelve; (3) its definition of 
the term "statement;" (4) its requirement that the statement be offered to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted therein; (5) the types of persons to 
whom the statement must have been made; (6) the fact that the ~tatement 
must not be admissible under any other hearsay exception; (7) the re-
quirement of corroborative evidence; (8) the requirement that the state-
ment must be reliable; (9) the statement's admissibility if the child is 
available or unavailable to testify at trial; (10) notice and discovery; and 
(11) the fact that the statute does not limit admissibility under other rules 
of evidence. 
A. Types of Proceedings 
The new exception will be available only in a "criminal proceeding" 
and only for a statement "concerning an alleged offense against the child 
[who made the statement] of child abuse, as defined under article 27, 
§ 35A of the Code."93 Thus, the hearsay statement will be inadmissible 
with regard to any other charged crime, such as a sexual offense under 
article 27, section 464B or section 464C of the Maryland Annotated 
Code94 or a crime of violence as defined in article 27, section 643B of the 
Maryland Annotated Code.95 
This restriction may discourage prosecutors from seeking indict-
ments under these other provisions in addition to section 35A when an 
indictment under that section is available and the prosecution intends to 
offer a statement under the new exception.96 There is no self-evident rea-
90. S. 66, 1988 Md. Laws 548, and H.D. 1018, 1988 Md. Laws 549 (as amended). 
91. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text, and text following note 89. 
92. See supra note 69. 
93. S. 66 § 9-103.1(b)(1). Article 27, section 35A(a)(2) of the Maryland Annotated 
Code defines the term "abuse" for purposes of the crime of causing abuse to a child 
under the age of eighteen. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(a)(2) (1987). 
94. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 464B, 464C (1987). 
95. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643B(a) (1987). Senate Bill 66, in the form in which it 
passed the Senate, extended to both section 35A crimes and section 643B crimes. 
The Senate acceded to the House position in conference. 
96. A trial court might find that a limiting instruction would be insufficient to protect 
28 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 17 
son to exclude prosecutions under the other sections. Apparently the 
legislators believed that all child abuse cases can be prosecuted under 
section 35A. 
The hearsay statement also will be inadmissible in noncriminal pro-
ceedings, such as child custody suits, civil suits for damages resulting 
from child abuse, and juvenile proceedings. 97 Although several other 
states restrict their comparable hearsay exceptions to criminal proceed-
ings, many do not. 98 Even Maryland's own statute providing for a 
child's testimony by closed-circuit television applies to custody and visi-
tation proceedings in which child abuse is alleged.99 The new hearsay 
exception should be at least as broad. loo The need for the evidence is 
strong in custody and visitation proceedings, because these proceedings 
concern the safety of the child. For the same reason, the exception also 
should be available in appropriate juvenile proceedings. 
B. Restriction to Child Victims Under Twelve 
The new exception under the 1988 Act applies to statements made 
by child victims under the age of twelve. Thus, the child must have been 
eleven years old or younger at the time he made the statement. This is a 
reasonable line to draw,101 because children in this age range are more 
susceptible to an inability to remember or understand the abuse and thus 
are more likely to be declared incompetent to testify at trial. 102 
It is also reasonable to restrict the declarants to child victims, as 
opposed to all child witnesses. The need for the evidence, one of the Ohio 
against the jury's use of the statement in its deliberations as to the non-section 35A 
crime and that separate trials would be required. See generally McLAIN, supra note 
13, § 105.1. 
97. Juvenile proceedings generally are not considered criminal proceedings. Adjudica-
tions of delinquency are not criminal convictions. MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE 
ANN. § 3-824(a)(1) (Supp. 1987). 
98. See supra note 64. 
99. See supra note 89. 
100. Like the closed-circuit television statute, Senate Bill 66, in the form in which it 
passed the Senate, would have extended to cases of child abuse as defined in section 
5-701 of the Family Law article of the Maryland Annotated Code. Section 5-901 of 
the Family Law article of the Maryland Annotated Code defines physical and sexual 
abuse, for purposes of that article, with regard to denial of custody or visitation 
under section 9-101. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5"901 (Supp. 1987). In confer-
ence, the Senate acceded to the House position. 
101. Of the statutes cited supra note 64, the Illinois (criminal), Oklahoma, Rhode Island, 
and Texas statutes apply to children under thirteen years of age (twelve years or 
younger); the California, Mississippi, Missouri, and Utah statutes set an age limit of 
under twelve; Florida and Vermont, under eleven (Florida provides for a "physical, 
mental, emotional or developmental age of 11 or less"); Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, 
Indiana, Minnesota, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Washington, under ten 
(under Minnesota law, the child may be over ten if mentally impaired); Maine, 
under fourteen; the Illinois civil statute, under eighteen; and the applicable age limit 
under the Colorado statute varies with the offense charged. See also Skoler, supra 
note 39, at 45-46 (suggesting age limit of under ten or eleven). 
102. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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v. Roberts criteria,103 is most compelling with respect to the victim's 
statement. If other children have made out-of-court statements exculpat-
ing the defendant, they may testify to their knowledge at trial. If they 
change their testimony at trial, they may be impeached by their prior 
statements; or, if they do not testify at trial, the court may consider their 
statements in its hearing on the trustworthiness of an out-of-court state-
ment by the child victim. 
C. Definition of Statement 
The new exception defines the term "statement" as including three 
categories, all of which fall under the traditional definition of the term 
"statement" for hearsay purposes. First, the statement may be an oral 
assertion,l04 such as the child's oral statement to his teacher, "Daddy 
hurt me." Second, the statement may be a written verbal assertion,105 
such as the child's handwritten note to the same effect. Third, the state-
ment may be nonverbal conduct if such conduct is intended as an asser-
tion, which conduct includes sounds, gestures, demonstrations, drawings, 
or similar actions.106 For example, nodding one's head affirmatively or 
negatively - or pointing - in response to a question is such conduct. 107 
The statute would apply to evidence that the child, when asked where he 
had been hurt, had pointed to that particular part of his body. Similarly, 
when a child who is asked to show with dolls how Daddy hurt her re-
sponds by manipulating the dolls,108 that action is a statement. 
The statute, however, will never apply to nonverbal nonassertive 
conduct,109 that is, conduct which the actor does not engage in as a sub-
stitute for words. It would not apply, for example, to evidence that a 
witness saw the victim running from the defendant's house, crying. 
D. Statement Must Be Offered to Prove the Truth 
of the Matter Asserted 
The 1988 Act makes clear that it will apply only to a statement 
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in that statement. Like 
103. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
104. S. 66 § 9-103.1(a)(l). 
105. [d. 
106. [d. § 9-103. 1 (a)(2). 
107. See McLAIN, supra note 13, at § 801.3. 
108. See, e.g., State v. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d 308, 310 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). . 
109. The statute differs in this way from Maryland common law, under which, in the 
rare instance in which nonverbal nonassertive conduct is offered as an implied asser-
tion on the part of the actor, such conduct is considered a statement for hearsay 
purposes. See McLAIN, supra note 13, § 801.4. Instead, the statute follows the 
model of FED. R. EVID. 801 on this point. See McLAIN, supra note 13, § 801.13 at 
286-87. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) provides: "A 'statement' is (1) an oral or written 
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an 
assertion. " 
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other hearsay exceptions, the 1988 Act does not apply to statements 
which are offered for nonhearsay purposes. 
Under certain circumstances, a child victim's out-of-court statement 
is admissible for nonhearsay purposes. For example, if the child testifies 
at trial, her testimony may be impeached by proof of her prior inconsis-
tent statement. I 10 That out-of-court statement would be admissible only 
to discredit the child's trial testimony, not as substantive proof of the 
truth of the fact asserted out of court. Thus, if the victim testifies at trial 
that her abuser had brown eyes (as does the defendant), the defense may 
impeach her testimony by asking her about her pretrial statement that 
the abuser had blue eyes. As long as the defense is not offering the pre-
trial statement to prove that the abuser in fact had blue eyes, the 1988 
Act does not apply. 
Similarly, if the child's testimony has been impeached by proof of 
her prior inconsistent statement, the prosecution may rehabilitate her 
credibility by proof of her prior consistent statement. III Thus, in the 
above example, on redirect examination the prosecutor could ask the 
child about another pretrial statement, made before the "blue eyes" state-
ment, that her abuser had brown eyes. Again, the prior consistent state-
ment would be admissible for nonhearsay purposes rather than for the 
purpose of proving that the abuser in fact had brown eyes. Compliance 
with the 1988 Act would not be necessary. 
E. Statement Must Have Been Made to a Physician, Psychologist, 
Social Worker, or Teacher 
The hearsay exception provided by the 1988 Act is available only if 
the child's out-of-court statement was made to, and is testified to by, a· 
teacher or a licensed physician, psychologist, or social worker. l12 That 
individual also must have been acting in the course of his profession 
when the child made the statement.1\3 
110. See generally McLAIN, supra note 13, § 613.1. Even if the child does not testify at 
trial, but the trial court admits her out-of-court statement under the 1988 Act or 
another hearsay exception, that evidence may be impeached (and rehabilitated) just 
as if she had testified in person at trial. See id. § 806.1. 
111. See generally id. § 613.2. 
112. Section 9-103J(b)(2) of the 1988 Act provides: 
113. Id. 
(i) An out of court statement may be admissible under this section only if 
the statement was made to and is offered by: 
1. A licensed physician, as defined under § 14-101 of the Health Oc-
cupations article; 
2. A licensed psychologist, as defined under § 16-101 of the Health 
Occupations article; 
3. A licensed social worker, as defined under § 18-10 1 of the Health 
Occupations article; or 
4. A teacher; and 
(ii) The individual described under item (i) of this paragraph was acting in 
the course of the individual's profession when the statement was 
made. 
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Thus, the 1988 Act - unlike most other states' similar stat-
utes l14 - very strictly limits the prosecution's options. A spontaneous 
statement made by a child to his parent or friend, for example, will not 
be admissible. If the child's first report of the alleged abuse is to someone 
other than a person in one of the four listed professions, then in order for 
the prosecution to invoke the hearsay exception, the child must be taken 
to see a physician, psychologist, or social worker. If in the presence of 
one of these persons the child again complains of abuse, the prosecution 
may attempt to offer that person as a witness at trial for the purpose of 
tetifying to the child's statement made in that person's presence. 
The 1988 Act incorporates by reference specific definitions of the 
terms "licensed physician," "psychologist," and "social worker."lls The 
statute provides no definition of the term "teacher." This category of 
individuals also is the only one of the statute's four categories which 
omits the restrictive adjective, "licensed." Apparently, then, this cate-
gory includes both licensed and unlicensed teachers employed in both 
public and private schools. It probably also should be read to include a 
teacher's assistant, whom the child would think of as a teacher, a reli-
gious education teacher,116 and a piano teacher who gives lessons in his 
own or the child's home. 
F. Statement Must Not Be Admissible Under Any 
Other Hearsay Exception 
The 1988 Act provides for admissibility only if the statement "is not 
admissible under any other hearsay exception."117 Presumably, the court 
must so find - at least preliminarily - in its hearing on the admissibility 
of the statement conducted outside the presence of the jury.llS If the 
court cannot so find, the hearing need not be continued. Of course, a 
pretrial finding of inadmissibility under other hearsay exceptions may be 
reversed at trial, if appropriate. 
114. See supra note 64 for restrictions in some other states. 
115. See supra note 112. These three categories were included in the House bill. Senate 
Bill 66, in the form in which it passed the Senate, did not limit the categories of 
persons to whom an admissible statement could have been made. The Senate bill 
would have given the prosecution the opportunity to demonstrate that a particular 
statement, such as the statement in Harnish v. State, 9 Md. App. 546, 266 A.2d 364 
(1970) (discussed supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text), was reliable under all 
the circumstances. 
116. The requirement that the teacher be acting in the course of his "profession" could 
be read, however, to exclUde nonprofessional teachers. This requirement, however, 
was included in the House bill and thus preceded the insertion of the fourth cate-
gory, "a teacher," in conference. The legislators' motivation for including this re-
quirement appears to have been to close a perceived loophole that otherwise would 
have been available if the child's parent or friend happened to be a physician, psy-
chologist, or social worker. 
117. S. 66 § 9-103. 1 (c)(2)(ii). 
118. See infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
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G. Requirement of Corroborative Evidence 
The 1988 Act conditions admissibility of an out-of-court statement 
that is otherwise qualified under that statute on the existence of "corrob-
orative evidence."1l9 The statute does not define that phrase. 120 Other 
states' statutes which condition admissibility on corroborative evi-
dence 121 generally require corroborative evidence "of the [alleged abu-
sive] act."122 Thus, an out-of-court statement such as "Daddy hurt me" 
will be corroborated sufficiently by evidence of the harm, and corrobora-
tion of the alleged abuser's identity would not be required. 
The Maryland General Assembly's omission from the 1988 Act of a 
definition of, or any restrictive phrase modifying, the phrase "corrobora-
tive evidence" permits a court to construe the provision broadly so as to 
require corrobative evidence of both the alleged abusive act and the al-
leged abuser's identity. At the other extreme, the absence of a definition 
arguably leaves a court with an illusory prerequisite to admissibility of 
the out-of-court statement, because a court may construe the provision so 
as not to require corroborative evidence specifically of either the alleged 
abusive act or the alleged abuser's identity. 
H Statement Must Be Reliable 
The 1988 Act permits the admission of reliable statements only and 
establishes several safeguards to prevent the admission of unreliable 
statements. Using the language of Ohio v. Roberts,123 the statute pro-
vides that "[a]n out of court statement may be admissible under this sec-
tion only if the statement possesses particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness."124 This requirement must be met regardless of whether 
the child testifies at trial. \25 
In making its determination as to admissibility, the trial court must 
conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury. 126 This will ensure 
that the jury not hear of and be prejudiced by a statement that the trial 
119. S. 66 § 9-103. 1 (c)(2)(iii). 
120. The Senate bill had required "corroborative evidence of the alleged offense;" the 
House bill did not employ the prepositional phrase, and in conference the Senate 
acceded to the House position. 
121. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text. 
122. See, e.g., the Colorado, Indiana, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Washington stat-
utes, cited supra note 64. The Florida and Mississippi statutes, supra note 64, re-
quire corroborative evidence "of the abuse or the offense;" the Utah statute, supra 
note 64, requires corroborative evidence "of the abuse." The Alaska and Arizona 
statutes, supra note 64, require evidence corroborating "the statement." 
123. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
124. S. 66 § 9-103. 1 (b)(3). 
125. In this respect the Maryland statute follows the Washington statute, supra note 66, 
rather than the ABA model statute, supra note 65. The ABA model statute would 
require a finding of reliability only if the child were unavailable to testify at trial. 
Imposing this requirement regardless of the child's availability is desirable, because 
it protects against the admission of unreliable statements as substantive proof. 
126. S. 66 § 9-103. 1 (e) provides: 
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court finds is not sufficiently reliable to be admitted.127 Although the 
1988 Act gives the courts flexibility by permitting them to conduct the 
hearing during trial, practical considerations usually will dictate that 
such a hearing be held before trial. 
In making its determination as to reliability, the trial court shall 
consider, but is not limited to, the following factors: 
(1) The child's personal knowledge of the event; 
(2) The certainty that the statement was made; 
(3) Any apparent motive to fabricate or exhibit partiality by 
the child, including interest, bias, corruption, or coercion; 
(4) Whether the statement was spontaneous or directly respon-
sive to questions; 
(5) The timing of the statement; 
(6) Whether the child's young age makes it unlikely that the 
child fabricated the statement that represents a graphic, de-
tailed account beyond the child's knowledge and experience 
and the appropriateness of the terminology to the child's age; 
(7) The nature and duration of the abuse; 
(8) The inner consistency and coherence of the statement; 
(9) Whether the child was suffering pain or distress when mak-
ing the statement; 
(10) Whether extrinsic evidence exists to show the defendant's 
opportunity to commit the act complained of in the child's 
statement; 
(11) Whether the statement is suggestive due to the use oflead-
ing questions; and 
(12) The credibility of the person testifying about the 
statement. 128 
Because this list of factors is expressly not exhaustive, the trial court also 
may consider other relevant circumstances. 
The specific considerations listed in the 1988 Act are those generally 
found in pre-existing models and other states' statutes. 129 Such a listing 
The court, in determining whether a statement is admissible under this 
section, in a hearing outside the presence of the jury, shaH: 
(1) Make a finding on the record as to the specific guarantees of trust-
worthiness that are present in the statement; and 
(2) Determine the admissibility of the statement. 
127. Some other states' statutes, such as Washington's, which has been upheld as consti-
tutional, contain similar provisions. See supra notes 49, 81 and accompanying text. 
128. S.66 § 9-103.1(d). If the child's statement was not his first statement reporting the 
abuse, some inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the later statement would 
be appropriate. 
129. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. Of the criteria listed in note 74, Mary-
land's statute contains the equivalent of aH but items (b), (e), (f), (i), (I), (0), (q), and 
(r). 
A few minor changes were made to the Maryland biH in conference. For exam-
ple, in the sixth factor, the phrase "fabricated the statement" was substituted in 
place of the phrase "fabricated a statement." The twelfth factor originaHy was in-
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is not necessary to ensure constitutionality but should give the courts 
guidance in making detailed findings as to reliability. 
The conference committee deleted from this list a factor included in 
the Senate bill, namely: "whether the statement was audiotaped or vide-
otaped, if taping would have been reasonably feasible."130 This deletion 
warrants the inference that the absence of taping should not be consid-
ered a negative factor. Nothing indicates that the legislators intended to 
discourage taping, however, and taping would be particularly helpful in 
establishing certainty that the statement was made. 
The 1988 Act requires the trial judge to "make a finding. on the 
record as to the specific guarantees of trustworthiness that are present in 
the statement"13l and to rule on the statement's admissibility.132 The 
detailed finding on the record will facilitate review on appeal. \33 
Only if the judge finds the statement to have sufficient particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness may the prosecution prove the statement at 
trial. Of course, the defense then may cross-examine the witness who 
testifies to the statement and may impeach the statement in any proper 
way, such as by proving prior inconsistent statements made by the 
child.134 In closing argument, defense counsel may point out to the jury 
any weaknesses in the statement and urge the jury to reject it. Defense 
counsel also may request the court to instruct the jury to consider care-
fully all facts relevant to the credibility of the statement. 135 
If the jury returns a guilty verdict, the defendant may appeal. The 
appellate court, on request, will review the trial court's decision as to the 
reliability of the statement and will reverse if the record is insufficient to 
support a finding of reliability. 136 
These safeguards against admitting an unreliable statement ade-
quately protect the defendant. The statute's additional limitation on the 
categories of persons to whom the statement must have been made137 is 
unnecessary and will compel the exclusion of other reliable - perhaps 
even more reliable l38 - statements. 
eluded under the second factor. The Senate acceded in conference to the use of the 
phrase, "is suggestive due to" in the eleventh factor in place of the clearer phrase, 
"was suggested by." 
130. See S. 66 § 9-103.I(d)(12) (pre-amendment). 
131. S. 66 § 9-103.l(e)(I). 
132. Id. § 9-103. I (e)(2). 
133. The Florida, Mississippi, and Vermont statutes, cited supra note 64, contain like 
provisions. The federal courts have established such a requirement with regard to 
the trial court's ruling as to whether to permit, under FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(I), 
impeachment of an accused by certain types of prior convictions. See McLAIN, 
supra note 13, § 609.6. 
134. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. 
135. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
136. See supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text. 
137. See supra notes 112-116 and accompanying text. 
138. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
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1 Statement May Be Admissible If Child Either Testifies at Trial or 
Is Unavailable to Testify for Certain Reasons 
3S 
Under the 1988 Act an out-of-court statement found reliable by the 
trial judge is admissible either if the child testifies at trial or if she is 
unavailable to testify for certain reasons. First, the statement is admissi-
ble "if the child is subject to cross-examination about the out of court 
statement and testifies: (i) at the criminal proceeding; or (ii) by closed-
circuit television."139 This is a key provision, because it permits qualify-
ing prior statements to be admitted as substantive evidence even if the 
child testifies at trial. 140 
Second, the statement is admissible if the child is unavailable to tes-
tify due to one of four causes: 
1. Death; 
2. Absence from the jurisdiction, for good cause shown, and 
the state has been unable to procure the child's presence by sub-
poena or other reasonable means; 
3. Serious physical disability; or 
4. Inability to communicate about the alleged offense due to 
serious emotional distress. 141 
The first three grounds for establishing unavailability are also set forth in 
the Maryland Rules regarding the use of depositions142 and are noncon-
troversial. The fourth ground is similar to the Maryland statutory pre-
requisite for allowing a child to testify over closed-circuit television, 143 
but for purposes of the 1988 Act the child's inability to communicate 
apparently would be so extreme as to preclude even televised testimony. 
A showing of this type of unavailability, therefore, would have to be at 
least as specific and convincing as that required in closed circuit televi-
sion cases. l44 
Without explanation, the 1988 Act omits other bases for unavaila-
139. S. 66 § 9-103. 1 (c)(1). With regard to Maryland's closed-circuit television statute, 
see supra note 89 and accompanying text. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has 
held that a finding that permits a child to testify over closed-circuit television be-
cause of " 'serious emotional distress' as a condition under which 'the child cannot 
reasonably communicate'" is "tantamount to a finding of unavailability in the 
[Ohio v.] Roberts sense .... " Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 519, 530 A.2d 275, 
286 (1987). 
140. See supra notes 66, 69-72 and accompanying text. 
141. S. 66 § 9-103.1(c)(2)(i). 
142. MD. R. 2-419(a)(3), 4-261(h)(I). 
143. See supra note 139. 
144. See Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496,530 A.2d 275 (1987) (prosecution's showing 
was insufficient to support finding that child would suffer such serious emotional 
distress, from testifying in open court, as to justify use of closed-circuit television. 
"[O]rdinarily the judge should observe and question the child. Additionally, testi-
mony about the likely impact on the particular child must be specific and must show 
much more than mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to testify." 
310 Md. at 524, 530 A.2d at 289) (footnote omitted). See also supra note 46 and the 
Florida statute, supra note 64. 
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bility, recognized elsewhere, including the child's complete failure of 
memory; persistent refusal to testify, despite judicial requests; mental dis-
ability; privilege; and incompetency.'45 Indeed, the statute is unique in 
its exclusion of incompetency as a basis for unavailability.'46 An incom-
petent witness is one who either does not understand the duty to tell the 
truth in court or who displays insufficient cognitive ability to testify 
meaningfully at trial. 147 Because it is the trial court's ruling that a child 
is incompetent to testify which so frequently results in the dropping of 
prosecutions under current law,'48 the exclusion of incompetency as a 
basis for unavailability will undercut severely the usefulness of the new 
hearsay exception. 
Although the General Assembly had before it several bills which 
would provide that all children who were victims of child abuse or of 
particular sexual offenses were competent to testify,'49 those bills were 
defeated in the House Judiciary Committee. 15o If any of such bills had 
145. See supra note 65 (ABA model statute). See also FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(I)-(4) (in-
cluding ruling of exemption on ground of privilege; refusal to testify despite an or-
der of the court; testimony to lack of memory; and physical or mental illness); MD. 
R. 4-261(h)(I) (regarding use of depositions in criminal cases, when, inter alia, wit-
ness is mentally incapacitated or "is present but refuses to testify and cannot be 
compelled to testify"). 
146. See supra notes 40, 48, 66 and 72. 
147. See McLAIN, supra note 13, §§ 6OLl, 601.3. "Cognitive ability" encompasses 
memory, intelligence, ability to observe, and ability to relate. Id. 
148. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. See also McLAIN, supra note 13, § 601.3. 
149. See generally Bulkley, Introduction: Background and Overview of Child Sexual 
Abuse: Law Reforms in the Mid-1980's, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 5, 12-13 (1985); 
Eatman & Bulkley, supra note 65, at 37-46 (rebuttable presumption of competency); 
Comment, The Competency Requirement for the Child Victim of Sexual Abuse: 
Must We Abandon It?, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 245 (1985); Comment, The Young 
Victim as Witness for the Prosecution: Another Form of Abuse?, 89 DICK. L. REV. 
721, 723-26 (1985). 
Proponents of across-the-board competency point out that Rule 601 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence (FRE) provides that "Every person is competent to be a 
witness except as otherwise provided in these rules." The federal rules specifically 
address only the competence of the sitting judge and the jurors hearing a case. FED. 
R. EVID. 605-606. But FRE 603 requires that a witness swear or otherwise affirm 
that he or she will testify truthfully, and the federal courts will rely on that rule to 
exclude the testimony of a person who will not do so. FRE 602 requires that a party 
offering a witness' testimony introduce evidence sufficient to support a finding that 
the witness has first-hand knowledge of the facts to which he or she will testify. 
McLAIN, supra note 13, § 602.2 at 24. The federal courts may also use FRE 401 
and 403 to exclude, as irrelevant or unduly prejudicial and a waste of time, the 
evidence of a person who has insufficient capacity to observe, remember, or commu-
nicate to make his or her testimony probative. See id. §§ 401.5, 403.9. Thus, FRE 
601 does not deprive the trial court of all discretion to exclude testimony of incom-
petent witnesses. This is a wise result, and such a safety valve is desirable not only 
for reasons of judicial economy, but also to ensure the litigants due process. Cf ILL. 
REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 704-6(4)(d) (Supp. 1987) (establishing rebuttable presumption 
of competency). 
150. Senate Bills 20 and 21 were withdrawn by the Senate Judicial Proceedings Commit-
tee. Senate Bill 280, which passed the Senate by a 45-to-l vote but which received 
an unfavorable report in the House Judiciary Committee, would have amended sec-
1987] Hearsay Exception for Child Abuse Victims 37 
passed, the exclusion of incompetency as a basis for unavailability from 
the 1988 Act would have been understandable. In the long run, however, 
passage of such a bill would not have been helpful, because a conclusive 
presumption of competency would violate due process. A provision that 
a child witness, like an adult, enjoys a rebuttable presumption of compe-
tency l51 would be constitutional and might encourage courts to allow 
more children to testify. 
The best alternative, however, would be the addition of incompe-
tency as a basis for unavailability under the 1988 Act. If the child is 
incompetent, he cannot testify, and there is great need for his out-of-
court statement if that statement is reliable. 152 If the prosecution can 
show that the statement is trustworthy, and if the trial judge articulates 
his reasons on the record for so finding,153 then the statement should be 
admitted. The 1988 Act should be amended to permit this result. 
J. Notice and Discovery 
The 1988 Act provides that if the prosecution intends to offer a 
statement under the statute, it must give advance notice to the defense as 
follows: 
(3) In order to provide the defendant with an opportunity to 
prepare a response to the statement, the prosecutor shall give to 
the defendant and the defendant's attorney, at least 20 days 
before the criminal proceeding in which the statement is to be 
offered into evidence, notice of: 
(i) the prosecutor's intention to introduce the statement; 
and 
(ii) the content of the statement. 154 
tion 9-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings article of the Maryland Anno-
tated Code by adding the following provision: 
(b)(I) Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of evidence, a 
child victim under the age of 12 is a competent witness and shall be 
allowed to testify without prior qualification in the following cases: 
(i) Child abuse, as defined in § 5-701 of the family law article or 
article 27, § 35A of the Code; 
(ii) A sexual offense, as defined in article 27, § 464, § 464A, 
§ 464B, or 464C of the Code; or 
(iii) Rape, as defined in article 27, § 462 or § 463 of the Code. 
(2) The trier of fact shall determine the weight and credibility to be 
given to the child victim's testimony. 
Its companion bill, House Bill 378, received an unfavorable report in the House 
Judiciary Committee. 
151. The court still could ·exclude testimony of a child victim who was shown to be 
incompetent. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 704-6(4)(d) (Supp. 1987) (providing in 
part, "There shall be a rebuttable presumption that a minor is competent to testify 
in abuse or neglect proceedings. "). 
152. See supra note 72. 
153. The 1988 Act requires such a finding on the record in any event. See S. 66 
§ 9-103.1(e)(I). 
154. Id. § 9-103. 1 (c)(3). 
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This provision is similar to that of several other states' statutes which 
provide for notice, except that some of those statutes only require notice 
sufficiently in advance of the proceedings to give the defendant a "fair 
opportunity to meet" the statement, and others require ten days' no-
tice. ISS Twenty days' notice, the apparently reasonable amount of time 
chosen by the Maryland legislature, is presumptively fair.ls6 
The statutes of some other states only require notice of the intention 
to offer the statement. IS7 Other states' statutes, like Maryland's, extend 
the notice requirement to the "content" or the "particulars" of the state-
ment. lss If the statement was written, audiotaped, or videotaped, the 
best course of action would be for the state to provide the defense with a 
copy of the statement. 
A novel provision in the 1988 Act gives the defendant the right to 
depose the witness by whom the state intends to prove the child's state-
ment. IS9 Specifically, the statute provides that "[t]he defendant shall 
have the right to take the deposition of a witness who will testify under 
this section . ... "160 This language could be interpreted to mean that the 
witness cannot be deposed until the trial judge has ruled that the witness 
will be permitted to give substantive testimony at trial. The apparent 
purpose of allowing the deposition, however, is to aid the defense in pre-
155. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
156. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
157. The California and Nevada statutes, supra note 64, so provide. Nevada's statute 
requires notice only if the child is unable or unavailable to testify at trial. 
158. The Indiana statute, supra note 64, requires notice of the statement's "content." 
The Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Minnesota, Missouri, and Oklahoma statutes, 
supra note 64, require notice of the "particulars" of the statement. The Utah stat-
ute, supra note 64, requires that the statement b.e made available to the defendant. 
The South Dakota statute, supra note 64, requires disclosure of the "particulars 
of [the statement], including the name and address of the declarant." The Texas 
statutes, supra note 64, require disclosure of the "name of the witness through 
whom [the proponent] intends to offer the statement" and a "written summary of 
the statement." 
The Mississippi and Florida notice provisions, supra note 64, which are nearly 
identical to each other, are the most liberal. The Mississippi statute provides: 
The notice shall include a written statement of the content of the child's 
statement, the time the statement was made, the circumstances surround-
ing the statement which indicate its reliability and such other particulars 
as necessary to provide full disclosure of the statement. 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-403(2) (Supp. 1987). 
159. S. 66 § 9-103. 1 (c)(4) provides: 
(i) The defendant shall have the right to take the deposition of a wit-
ness who will testify under this section; 
(ii) Unless the state and the defendant agree, or the court orders 
otherwise, the defendant shall file a notice of deposition at least 5 days 
before the date of the deposition; and 
(iii) Except where inconsistent with this paragraph, the provisions of 
Maryland Rule 4-261 shall apply to a deposition taken under this 
paragraph. 
By implication, the state also must provide the defense with the name and address of 
the prosecution's witness. 
160. [d. § 9-103.1(c)(4)(i) (emphasis supplied). 
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paring to attack the admissibility of the child's out-of-court statement. 
Therefore, the deposition most likely is intended to precede the trial 
court's hearing on that preliminary question, at which the witness would 
also testify. 
K. No Limitation on Other Rules of Evidence 
Finally, the 1988 Act explicitly states that it "may not be construed 
to limit the admissibility of a statement under any other applicable hear-
say exception or rule of evidence." 161 Thus, the stringent requirements 
of the 1988 Act do not apply if a child's out-of-court statement is admis-
sible either as nonhearsay162 or as substantive proof under another hear-
say exception. 163 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Many child abuse prosecutions in Maryland previously could not be 
pursued, because under the pre-1988 law the state was unable to present 
sufficient evidence of the perpetrator's identity without the live testimony 
at trial of the child victim. The Maryland General Assembly should be 
applauded for passing a bill that creates a hearsay exception for reliable 
out-of-court statements made by alleged child abuse victims to physi-
cians, psychologists, social workers, and teachers. The legislature acted 
cautiously, however, and took only a hesitant step forward. As a result, 
Maryland has a hearsay exception which will be of some help when the 
child can testify at trial, but will be useless when the child is incompetent 
to testify. Thus, the state must continue to cope with the problem that 
when the child is found to be incompetent, the state must drop the prose-
cution entirely. 
Hopefully, once the courts have had occasion to construe this new 
hearsay exception statute, the legislature will realize that the exception is 
more than fair to defendants. The legislature should extend the excep-
tion to other appropriate criminal and appropriate civil proceedings, 
should make it available when the child is incompetent to testify, and 
should permit its use regardless of the status of the person to whom the 
child made a reliable statement. 
161. See ARK. R. EVID. 803(25)(A)(4) (1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.075.4 (Vernon 
Supp. 1987). 
162. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text. 
163. See supra notes 21-36 and accompanying text. 
